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Article 3

BEYOND NEUTRALITY: HOW ZERO RATING CAN
(SOMETIMES) ADVANCE USER CHOICE, INNOVATION,
AND DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION
BJ ARD *
ABSTRACT
Over four billion people across the globe cannot afford Internet
access. Their economic disadvantages are compounded by their
inability to utilize the communicative, educational, and
commercial tools that most Internet users take for granted. Enter
zero rating. Mobile Internet providers in the developing world
now waive the data charges for services like Facebook,
Wikipedia, or local job-search sites. Despite zero rating’s
apparent benefits, many advocates seek to ban the practice as a
violation of net neutrality.
This Article argues that zero rating is defensible by net
neutrality’s own normative lights. Network neutrality is not
about neutrality for its own sake, but about advancing consumer
choice and welfare, innovation in the development of new
services, and democratic participation in the public sphere.
Analysis of zero rating should accordingly focus on the question
of how it impacts these goals: we ought to embrace zero-rating
programs that advance net neutrality’s substantive goals and
reserve our skepticism for those services that would sacrifice the
network’s generative potential to pursue mere short-term gains.
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INTRODUCTION
Internet access is prohibitively expensive for over four billion people
across the globe. 1 Mobile Internet carriers throughout the developing world
have taken steps to close this gap through the practice of “zero rating,”
where they permit their subscribers to access websites or applications from
select edge providers at no charge.2 Hundreds of millions of users now take
advantage of zero-rated services like Facebook’s Free Basics, which offers
access to sites like Facebook, Google, and Wikipedia alongside localized
resources ranging from Ebola health advisories to women’s rights
applications and job postings. 3 As of 2014, forty-five percent of mobile
operators around the world offered at least one zero-rated application.4
Despite zero rating’s popularity, net neutrality advocates have argued
that the practice should be condemned as a violation of net neutrality’s nondiscrimination principle. Barbara van Schewick argues that “zero-rating is
the next big threat to innovation and free speech online.” 5 Susan Crawford
1. See U.N. INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION, ICT FACTS AND FIGURES 1
(2015), http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Documents/facts/ICTFactsFigures2015.pdf.
2. “Carriers,” as referenced throughout this Article, are the companies that provide Internet
access. Domestic examples include mobile carriers like AT&T and T-Mobile. “Edge providers”
are the sites or applications that subscribers utilize once they are online, like Google or Twitter.
3. See infra Part I.A.2.
4. ALLOT COMMUNICATIONS, APP-CENTRIC OPERATORS ON THE RISE: ALLOT MOBILE
TRENDS CHARGING REPORT H1/2014, at 1 (2014), http://www.allot.com/wpcontent/uploads/RP_MobileTrends_Charging_Report_H1_2014_LR_Publish.pdf.
5. Joel Rose, What Net Neutrality Rules Could Mean for Your Wireless Carrier, NPR ALL
TECH
CONSIDERED
(Feb.
25,
2015)
(quoting
van
Schewick),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2015/02/25/388948293/what-net-neutrality-rulescould-mean-for-your-wireless-carrier. Professor van Schewick has also specifically criticized the
FCC for its failure to regulate zero rating in the United States rules. BARBARA VAN SCHEWICK,
ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED NETWORK NEUTRALITY RULES 7–9 (Feb. 18, 2015),
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is adamant in her own rejection of the practice: “Zero-rating is pernicious;
it’s dangerous; it’s malignant.” 6 Advocacy groups and many in the popular
press likewise call zero rating at best a “dangerous compromise.” 7 And in
May 2015, over sixty-five non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”)
joined an open letter to denounce Facebook’s efforts to launch its
Internet.org program to serve poor communities in India.8 The Telecom
Regulatory Authority of India (“TRAI”) subsequently banned the program
notwithstanding Facebook’s mobilization of over a million users for a
write-in campaign. 9
Those who defend zero rating typically argue that its connectivity
benefits justify the apparent departure from net neutrality. From their
perspective, limited access is better than no access because it allows people
to communicate and improve their lives using tools that would otherwise
remain out of reach.10 To the extent net neutrality would prohibit these
arrangements, commentators have cast the issue as a “faceoff between

http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/downloads/vanSchewick2015AnalysisofProposedNetworkNeutrality
Rules.pdf.
6. Susan Crawford, Zero for Conduct, MEDIUM.COM BACKCHANNEL (Jan. 7, 2015),
https://medium.com/backchannel/less-than-zero-199bcb05a868.
Crawford concludes that
“[r]egulators around the world are watching how the U.S. deals with zero-rating, and we should
outlaw it. Immediately.” Id.
7. See Jeremy Malcolm, Net Neutrality and the Global Divide, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUND. (July 24, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/07/net-neutrality-and-global-digitaldivide; see also, e.g., Raegan MacDonald, Wikipedia Zero and Net Neutrality: Wikimedia Turns
NOW
(Aug.
8,
2014),
Its
Back
on
the
Open
Internet,
ACCESS
https://www.accessnow.org/blog/2014/08/08/wikipedia-zero-and-net-neutrality-wikimedia-turnsits-back-on-the-open (“[Wikipedia] Zero clearly violates net neutrality and is an attack on the
future of the open internet.”). In one of the most provocative examples, technology scholar John
Naughton asserted that “[b]y condoning zero-rating we will condemn [people] to a lifetime of
servitude as one of Master Zuckerberg’s sharecroppers.” John Naughton, If the Price of Giving
Everyone Internet Access Is Total Domination by Facebook, It’s Not Worth It, THE GUARDIAN
(Jan. 10, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jan/11/internet-access-developingnations-facebook-domination.
8. See Cade Metz, Backlash Against Facebook’s Free Internet Service Grows, WIRED (May
18, 2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/05/backlash-facebooks-free-internet-service-grows/; see
also Open Letter to Mark Zuckerberg Regarding Internet.org, Net Neutrality, Privacy, and
Security (May 18, 2015), https://www.facebook.com/notes/accessnoworg/open-letter-to-markzuckerberg-regarding-internetorg-net-neutrality-privacy-and-/935857379791271
[hereinafter
Open Letter to Mark Zuckerberg].
9. See Prohibition of Discriminatory Tariffs for Data Services Regulations, 2016, Gazette of
India, sec. B(4) (Feb. 8, 2016); Anuj Srivas, What Facebook’s Spat with TRAI Tells Us About the
Ethics of Digital Lobbying, WIRE (Jan. 15, 2016), http://thewire.in/2016/01/15/what-facebooksspat-with-trai-tells-us-about-the-ethics-of-digital-lobbying-19316/. While Facebook claims that it
mobilized over eleven million users, TRAI confirmed receipt of only 1.89 million emails. See
Srivas, supra.
10. See, e.g., Erik Moeller, Wikipedia Zero and Net Neutrality: Protecting the Internet as a
Public Space, WIKIMEDIA BLOG (Aug. 1, 2014), http://blog.wikimedia.org/2014/08/01/wikipediazero-and-net-neutrality-protecting-the-internet/ (arguing that “ensuring free access to important
resources like Wikipedia is a social justice issue”).
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human rights and network neutrality principles.” 11 The debate, as it has
developed so far, shines light on net neutrality’s limitations as a policy lever
for achieving distributive justice, and forces scholars and policymakers to
consider how communications law should balance net neutrality’s nondiscrimination principle against competing priorities in communications
law. 12
This Article steps back from that debate to argue that zero rating is
defensible even by net neutrality’s own normative lights. Network
neutrality is not about neutrality for its own sake, but about advancing
consumer choice and welfare, 13 innovation in the development of new
services, 14 and democratic participation in the public sphere.15 Scholars
may disagree about which of these factors to prioritize, but these goals
share a common thread: each seeks to facilitate diverse contributions from
the Internet’s global audience in order to maximize the network’s benefits
for all its participants. Collectively, we can call these net neutrality’s
“generativity” goals, applying Jonathan Zittrain’s term for a system with the
capacity “to produce unanticipated change through unfiltered contributions

11. Alex Howard, Zero Rating Poses a Conundrum for Net Neutrality Advocates Around the
World, TECHREPUBLIC (Jan. 23, 2015), http://www.techrepublic.com/article/zero-rating-poses-aconundrum-for-net-neutrality-advocates-around-the-world/. Arturo Carrillo’s forthcoming article
develops a thoughtful human-rights approach to the question, asserting that net neutrality and
connectivity of the sort provided by zero rating are both facets of the right to free expression. See
Arturo J. Carrillo, Having Your Cake and Eating It Too? Zero-Rating, Net Neutrality and
International Law at 35-38 (SSRN Elec. Library, Working Paper No. 2,746,447, Mar. 6, 2016),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2746447 (forthcoming 19 STAN. TECH. L REV. (2016)).
12. Olivier Sylvain offers an excellent account of net neutrality’s distributive difficulties in
his article Network Equality, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 443 (2016). As Ellen Goodman argues in her
forthcoming analysis of zero rating, moreover, the debate has exposed the “edge-provider
centrism” of net neutrality, or its preoccupation with edge providers’ interests rather than those of
users themselves. Ellen P. Goodman, Zero Rating: Equality and Free Speech at the Other Edge at
9 (Working Paper, Apr. 4, 2016), http://riipl.rutgers.edu/wp-content/uploads/goodman-zerorating-draft-1.pdf (forthcoming COLO. TECH. L.J. (2017)).
13. See, e.g., Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality and Quality of Service: What a
Nondiscrimination Rule Should Look Like, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (2015) (arguing netneutrality rules are necessary to cover the full range of relevant economic and noneconomic
concerns implicated by network discrimination).
14. See, e.g., BARBARA VAN SCHEWICK, INTERNET ARCHITECTURE AND INNOVATION
(2012); Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 294
(2007); Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture
of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925, 931–32 (2001); Tim Wu, Network
Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141, 145 (2003).
15. See, e.g., DAWN C. NUNZIATO, VIRTUAL FREEDOM: NET NEUTRALITY AND FREE
SPEECH IN THE INTERNET AGE (2009); Marvin Ammori, First Amendment Architecture, 2012
WIS. L. REV. 1, 7 (asserting “that network neutrality furthers free speech goals”); Jack M. Balkin,
The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 427, 438 (2009); Susan P.
Crawford, The Internet and the Project of Communications Law, 55 UCLA L. REV. 359, 391
(2007) (“The online world enables the creation of new relationships and thus new ideas that are
key to our future economic growth.”).
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from broad and varied audiences.” 16 In short, net neutrality’s purpose is not
to achieve neutrality per se, but to advance generativity.
Zero rating has real potential to advance these aspects of generativity.
When users cannot otherwise afford access, zero rating can enhance user
choice by offering users new options. It can spur innovation by creating
platforms that connect developers to new markets and inducing them to
create apps for poorer users whose needs would otherwise be ignored. And
it can facilitate democratic participation not only by delivering users the
tools to engage in free speech online, but also by increasing users’
educational and economic prospects so as to give them a greater voice both
online and off. Zero rating might even foment political and economic
demand for full Internet access by showing underserved communities how
the Internet is relevant to their lives.
Our analysis of zero rating should accordingly focus on the question of
how it impacts generativity: we ought to embrace zero-rating programs that
advance net neutrality’s own normative goals and reserve our skepticism for
those services that would sacrifice the network’s generative potential to
pursue mere short-term gains. Network management practices can be
discriminatory yet generative at the same time. Take the example of spam
and virus filtering: carriers routinely block these forms of malicious and
unwanted content. One could argue that these filters violate net neutrality
in their departure from strict nondiscrimination, despite their apparent
benefits to users. But the practice is defensible in terms of its salutary
effects for the Internet’s generativity: removing the threat of malware frees
users to engage with new apps and communities that they might have
avoided in a less secure environment.
Regulators nonetheless face a difficult task in evaluating whether
specific zero rating programs are generative. Zero rating is a new practice,
and predictions are speculative: the critics hypothesize that carriers will
deploy zero rating in ways that stifle innovation and free speech, while
supporters hope that it will allow for new forms of human flourishing.
Rather than indulge in speculation, policymakers ought to design policy
experiments that will generate the information necessary to test these
competing hypotheses and design appropriate regulations.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I introduces existing zerorating programs. These programs are not monolithic: while some platforms
resemble walled gardens, others are open platforms structured to facilitate
entry by third parties and promote users’ free expression. This Part also

16. See JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET: AND HOW TO STOP IT 70
(2008). Jack Balkin draws a similar connection between these ideas: “[W]e best serve free speech
values by decentralizing and promoting innovation, by letting lots of different people experiment
with a wide variety of new ways of communicating, sharing information, associating, and building
things together.” Balkin, supra note 15, at 438.
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develops a three-part framework for comparing programs based on (1) their
payment structures; (2) their processes for selecting which edge providers
to zero-rate; and (3) their communications modalities (i.e., the degree to
which the services permit users to communicate with one another and the
larger online world).
Part II assesses the net-neutrality objection. Zero rating’s proponents
have the better side of the argument as to the practice’s short-term
generativity benefits: it is hard to dispute that extending zero-rated services
to people who otherwise lack Internet access is an improvement over the
status quo. The more difficult question goes to its long-term effects. Zero
rating might cannibalize demand for affordable, general-purpose Internet
and thereby crowd out more generative alternatives for promoting access to
underserved communities. Alternatively, it might serve as a stepping stone
to broader reforms by introducing the Internet to constituents who are
unfamiliar with its potential.
Part III delves into the question of regulatory design. At present there
are more questions than answers regarding the costs and benefits of zero
rating. Regulators therefore ought to experiment with policies designed to
produce better information on zero rating and its role in
telecommunications policy. Part IV continues the discussion with an
exploration of specific policy interventions that regulators could test to
mitigate zero rating’s risks while promoting its generative potential.
I. ZERO RATING IN PRACTICE
Zero rating is not monolithic. Its implementations range from plans
that offer free access to a single website to those that offer a comprehensive
platform for mobile applications. And programs vary considerably
depending on the degree of control that the carriers exercise in deciding
which sites or services to feature. Understanding the specific user benefits
and anti-competitive risks for each of these approaches is a prerequisite to
effective zero-rating regulation. This Part accordingly details and compares
both the structures and functional features of existing programs.
A. Zero-Rating Models
As of 2014, nearly one hundred different mobile Internet providers
throughout the world offered some form of zero-rated service. 17 This
Article identifies the primary approaches to zero rating by using the bestknown programs as examples.

17. See ALLOT COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 4, at 1, 12.
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1. Single-Website Plans
The simplest zero-rating plans offer just one website for free. This
discussion focuses on three of these plans: Facebook Zero, the first zerorated service; Wikipedia Zero, which demonstrates a more transparent
approach; and Virgin Mobile’s a la carte “Custom” plan in the United
States.
a. Facebook Zero
Facebook Zero launched as the first zero-rated service in May 2010,
offering free Facebook through more than fifty different mobile carriers
across forty-five countries and territories. 18 It offers a simplified version of
the Facebook site, one optimized for use on feature phones like those
prevalent throughout the developing world. 19 One of the more noticeable
differences between Facebook Zero and Facebook’s standard interface is
the lack of photos: Facebook Zero is by default text only. 20 Users who wish
to view nontext content, for example to view profile pictures, must purchase
a data subscription to download the images. Users who wish to follow
external links to material not hosted on Facebook must likewise pay for
data. 21
Facebook has not made information regarding its business
arrangements with mobile carriers available to the public. It is therefore
difficult to verify whether Facebook compensates carriers for the bandwidth
consumed by Facebook Zero, or whether the carriers instead offer Facebook
Zero without compensation to attract new subscribers (or entice subscribers
to pay for data so they can download photos and follow links to sites
outside Facebook proper). 22 The idea that carriers might offer Facebook

18. See Matt Hicks, Fast and Free Facebook Mobile Access with 0.facebook.com,
FACEBOOK BLOG (May 18, 2010), https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook/fast-and-freefacebook-mobile-access-with-0facebookcom/391295167130; Christopher Mims, Facebook’s Plan
To Find Its Next Billion Users: Convince Them the Internet and Facebook Are the Same, QUARTZ
(Sept. 24, 2012), http://qz.com/5180/facebooks-plan-to-find-its-next-billion-users-convince-themthe-internet-and-facebook-are-the-same/.
19. See Mims, supra note 18. Feature phones lack the processing power of today’s
smartphones yet still have the capacity to go online. See id. Offering Internet through these
devices makes use of what limited infrastructure is already in place: more people in the
developing world have access to mobile phones than to other staples of modern life such as toilets,
let alone home computers or landline connections. See Deputy UN Chief Calls for Urgent Action
To Tackle Global Sanitation Crisis, UNITED NATIONS NEWS CENTRE (Mar. 21, 2013),
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44452.
20. Mims, supra note 18.
21. Id.
22. Accord Pedro Henrique Soares Ramos, Towards a Developmental Framework for Net
Neutrality: The Rise of Sponsored Data Plans in Developing Countries at 8 & n.38 (SSRN Elec.
Library, Working Paper No. 2,418,307, Mar. 31, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2418307; Mims,
supra note 18.
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Zero bandwidth for free is plausible in light of the disclosure that
Facebook’s more comprehensive zero-rating program—Facebook Free
Basics—does not pay carriers. 23 It is also difficult to verify whether the
parties impose any sort of exclusivity agreements on one another, such as
restricting mobile carriers from zero-rating services that compete with
Facebook, or restricting Facebook from partnering with other carriers in the
same country or region. 24
b. Wikipedia Zero
The Wikimedia Foundation launched Wikipedia Zero in 2012.25 What
began as an arrangement with a single mobile carrier—Orange Telecom—
has grown to cover sixty-two countries through eighty-two different
carriers, serving more than six hundred million subscribers. 26 Like
Facebook Zero, Wikipedia Zero began as a text-only site, but the program
has expanded to offer images and other multimedia content to Wikipedia
Zero users. 27 Importantly, the full mobile version is designed to allow users
to edit Wikipedia pages like any other user, allowing Wikipedia Zero’s
users to participate not only as readers but also as contributors.28
In an effort to maintain transparency and accountability, the
Wikimedia Foundation has publicly posted the operating principles for
Wikipedia Zero. 29 Several of these principles protect the user experience.
The Wikimedia Foundation commits, for example, to providing the full
version of the site to all users, to excluding mobile carriers from exercising
editorial control, and to maintaining the confidentiality of records collected

23. See infra Part I.A.2.
24. Pedro Soares Ramos’ study of Facebook Zero’s existing partnerships suggests, however,
that in Latin America, Facebook may have made exclusive arrangements with the mobile provider
Claro. Ramos, supra note 22, at 8 n.38.
25. See Kul Wadhwa, Free Mobile for Wikipedia Starts with Orange, WIKIMEDIA BLOG
(Jan. 24, 2012), http://blog.wikimedia.org/2012/01/24/free-mobile-for-wikipedia-starts-withorange/.
FOUNDATION,
26. Wikipedia
Zero,
WIKIMEDIA
http://wikimediafoundation.org/wiki/Wikipedia_Zero (last visited Jan. 23, 2016).
27. I thank Yana Welinder, Legal Director of the Wikimedia Foundation, for this insight into
the program’s development.
28. See Samuel Gibbs, Erik Möller: Wikipedia Can Be Read on Mobile for Free in
(Aug.
8,
2014),
Developing
World,
GUARDIAN
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/aug/08/erik-moller-wikipedia-can-be-read-onmobile-for-free-in-developing-world; see also Joe Sutherland, Ram Prasad Joshi: Writing
Wikipedia from the Western Hills of Nepal, WIKIMEDIA BLOG (June 24, 2014),
https://blog.wikimedia.org/2014/06/24/writing-wikipedia-from-the-western-hills-of-nepal/
(recognizing a Nepali man for contributing over 6000 edits to the Nepali Wikipedia using only a
feature phone prior to the introduction of Wikipedia Zero).
FOUNDATION,
29. Wikipedia
Zero
Operating
Principles,
WIKIMEDIA
http://wikimediafoundation.org/wiki/Wikipedia_Zero_Operating_Principles (last visited Jan. 23,
2016); see Moeller, supra note 10.
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by Wikipedia. 30 Other operating principles reduce the potential for
Wikipedia Zero to distort the local mobile market: the Wikimedia
Foundation disavows any exchange of payment and any exclusivity
agreements. 31 In the same spirit, the Wikimedia Foundation prohibits
carriers from using Wikipedia Zero as an enticement to purchase special
service bundles. 32 Indeed, the Foundation requires that participating
carriers allow all their subscribers to access Wikipedia Zero, even those
subscribers who purchase no data plan at all.33
Wikipedia Zero is also noteworthy because would-be users have
asserted grassroots demands for the service. In November 2012, students at
Sinenjongo High School, in the economically poor South African township
of Joe Slovo, launched a petition asking South African mobile providers to
join the Wikipedia Zero project.34 As the students explained, they lacked
adequate computer facilities at school to conduct research or obtain
supplemental reading materials.35 They had no library at their school, and
they could not reach their closest library after school before it closed each
evening. 36 Yet ninety percent of them owned Internet-capable cell
phones. 37 South African mobile provider MTN took up the students’ cause
by partnering with the Wikimedia Foundation to offer Wikipedia Zero.38
c. Virgin Mobile Custom
The single-website approach has also made inroads domestically.
Virgin Mobile’s “Custom” plan offers a special deal so that customers can
sign up for unlimited access to Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, or Pinterest.39

30. Wikipedia Zero Operating Principles, supra note 29.
31. Id.
32. Id.; see also Yana Welinder & Carolynne Schloeder, Chilean Regulator Welcomes
BLOG
(Sept.
22,
2014),
Wikipedia
Zero,
WIKIMEDIA
http://blog.wikimedia.org/2014/09/22/chilean-regulator-welcomes-wikipedia-zero/.
33. See Wikipedia Zero Operating Principles, supra note 29.
34. See The 1 Generous Thing Mobile Providers Could Do to Help Kids All Over the World,
https://www.change.org/p/the-1-generous-thing-mobile-providers-could-do-toCHANGE.ORG,
help-kids-all-over-the-world (last visited Jan. 23, 2016) [hereinafter Change.org Petition]; see also
Moeller, supra note 10.
35. Change.org Petition, supra note 34.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Victor Grigas, MTN South Africa Responds to Sinenjongo High School Open Letter and
BLOG
(Mar.
18,
2014),
Launches
Wikipedia
Zero,
WIKIMEDIA
http://blog.wikimedia.org/2014/03/18/mtn-south-africa-responds-to-sinenjongo-high-school-openletter-and-launches-wikipedia-zero/.
39. See Issie Lapowsky, Virgin Mobile’s New Wireless Plan Is Like Netflix for Your Phone,
WIRED (July 31, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/07/virgin-mobiles-new-wireless-plan-is-likenetflix-for-your-phone/.
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And this plan—which Virgin offers exclusively through Walmart 40—
appears to be aimed at lower-income users. There is an element of user
choice—the user gets to pick which one of these sites to zero-rate, and can
pay extra for access to more than one. But the user is limited to selecting
from those sites that Virgin Mobile has included on its menu.
2. Website Bundles
Some zero-rating plans go beyond offering access to a single website
and instead bundle together several preselected websites. Facebook’s Free
Basics—formerly Internet.org—is the most well-known of these, but other
services like T-Mobile’s domestic Music Freedom and Binge On plans
operate on a similar model.
a. Facebook Free Basics
Free Basics offers a suite of zero-rated commercial sites alongside
public information and NGO resources that vary from country to country.
When the program launched as Internet.org in Zambia, for example, it
offered not only access to Facebook, Google’s search page, and Wikipedia,
but also the option to browse local job listings, read UNICEF health
advisories regarding Ebola, and connect with the Zambian women’s rights
network. 41 Following its Zambian launch in July 2014, the program has
expanded to cover sixteen countries. 42
In its first Internet.org incarnation, Facebook unilaterally selected sites
for inclusion in the service through a closed process. Following heavy
protests in India—where users’ rights groups argued the service violated net
neutrality 43—Facebook changed tack and opened Internet.org to
40. See Virgin Mobile USA Launches Virgin Mobile Custom—Fully Customizable Cell
Phone Plan with Rich Parental Controls, VIRGIN MOBILE NEWSROOM (July 30, 2014),
http://newsroom.virginmobileusa.com/press-release/handsets/virgin-mobile-usa-launches-virginmobile-custom-%E2%80%93-fully-customizable-cell-pho.
41. See Mat Honan, Facebook-Backed Nonprofit Brings Free Internet to Zambia, WIRED
(July 31, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/07/internet-org-zambia/; Guy Rosen, Introducing the
Internet.org App, INTERNET.ORG (July 31, 2014), https://www.internet.org/press/introducing-theinternet-dot-org-app. Note that—although Wikipedia is included in the service—Wikipedia did
not ask to be included. See Sriram Srinivasan, I Think Wikipedia Should Be Objecting to How
Internet.org Is Using Their Site, THE HINDU (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.thehindu.com/scitech/technology/internet/i-think-wikipedia-should-be-objecting-to-howinternetorgis-using-theirsite/article6882515.ece (interviewing Ethan Zuckerman of the Center for Civic Media at MIT).
Rather, Facebook made the unilateral decision to include it.
42. See Wikipedia, Internet.org, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet.org (last visited Mar.
16, 2016) (detailing Internet.org’s launch timeline).
43. See, e.g., Mahesh Murthy, Poor Internet for Poor People: Why Facebook’s Internet.org
Amounts to Economic Racism, QUARTZ (Apr. 17, 2015), http://qz.com/385821/poor-internet-forpoor-people-why-facebooks-internet-org-amounts-to-economic-racism/; Matthew Wall, Indian
Companies Withdraw from Facebook’s Internet.org, BBC NEWS (Apr. 16, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-32334181.
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applications from any site or service that meets its participation guidelines.
Specifically, Facebook invites applications from apps that encourage the
user to explore the larger Internet, comply with efficiency guidelines (i.e.,
by avoiding bandwidth-intensive features), and meet a set of technical
specifications. 44 Facebook also made clear that Internet.org did not pay
carriers, deflecting any charges that Facebook bribed carriers for privileged
access. 45 One year after launch, Facebook reported that more than half of
people who tried Internet.org had purchased full Internet access within the
first thirty days. 46
As noted in the Introduction above, however, over sixty NGOs joined
a letter denouncing the project even after Facebook opened the platform to
new applications. 47 Among more general complaints about the limits of
zero rating, the protestors objected that the name of the platform—
“Internet.org”—misled users into thinking its limited offering was
equivalent to the Internet.48 They also objected to the content of the
technical specifications, specifically Facebook’s refusal to support
encryption and secure-browsing technologies. 49 As the critics argued,
Facebook’s failure to support encryption rendered users’ web traffic
“vulnerable to malicious attacks and government eavesdropping.” 50
Facebook addressed these concerns when it renamed the program
“Free Basics” in September 2015, jettisoning its potentially misleading
name, and committed itself to supporting secure browsing “wherever
possible.” 51 TRAI nonetheless banned the service in February of this
year. 52 Ongoing criticism focuses on the remaining defects in Facebook’s

44. See Aman Shah & Nivedita Bhattacharjee, Facebook Opens Internet.org to Developers
(May
4,
2015),
Amid
Open
Web
Debate
in
India,
REUTERS
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/04/us-facebook-internet-idUSKBN0NP0ES20150504;
Internet.org Participation Guidelines, FACEBOOK, https://developers.facebook.com/docs/internetorg/participation-guidelines (last visited Jan. 23, 2016).
45. Murthy, supra note 43. Query, however, whether wealth transfers from a major U.S.
firm like Facebook to developing-world Internet providers might help fund the expansion of local
telecommunications infrastructure. See infra Part IV.B.3.
46. One Year In: Internet.org Free Basic Services, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (July 26, 2015),
http://newsroom.fb.com/news/2015/07/one-year-in-internet-org-free-basic-services/.
47. See Metz, supra note 8.
48. See Open Letter to Mark Zuckerberg, supra note 8; see also id. (objecting that the
program acts as a walled garden, creates risks for free expression, and threatens to narrow the
digital divide by creating a two-tiered Internet).
49. See id.
50. Id.
51. Jessi Hempel, Facebook Renames Its Controversial Internet.org App, WIRED (Sept. 24,
2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/09/facebook-renames-controversial-internet-org-app.
52. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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security protocol 53 and on the potential for Facebook to abuse its position
by surveilling the traffic routed through the Free Basics program. 54
b. T-Mobile Music Freedom
In the United States, T-Mobile has unveiled two zero-rated service
bundles. The first, Music Freedom, offers unlimited access to popular
music services including Spotify, Pandora, and Apple’s new “Apple Music”
without having to worry about data caps.55 While T-Mobile retains the
discretion to choose which streaming services to include, in effect it has
exempted all the major streaming services from data charges and now
waives data charges for thirty-three different services.56 The second, Binge
On, takes a similar approach to video streaming. At launch it offered
unlimited access to twenty-four different video sites, including Netflix,
Hulu, and ESPN (though YouTube is conspicuously absent). 57 Streaming
sites that wish to join the program must comply with technical requirements
including a downgrade in video quality to a less bandwidth-intensive
resolution. 58
The reaction to Music Freedom was more positive than for Binge On.
Commenting specifically on these programs, Professor Barbara van
Schewick argued that Music Freedom might be a permissible form of zero
rating; even though the service discriminates in favor of music streaming
relative to other data, the competitive harm is mitigated because T-Mobile
refuses to discriminate between music-streaming applications.59 Following
53. See Access Team, Free Basics vs. Basic Internet Freedom: Three Questions for Mark
Zuckerberg, ACCESS NOW (Sept. 24, 2015), https://www.accessnow.org/free-basics-vs-basicinternet-freedom-three-questions-for-mark-zuckerberg/; Eben Moglen & Mishi Choudhary,
Fictional Internet Policy Is Bad for India, Good Only for Facebook, TECH2 (Sept. 28, 2015),
http://tech.firstpost.com/news-analysis/fictional-internet-policy-is-bad-for-india-good-only-forfacebook-282664.html (“No one using ‘Free Basics’ will ever be able to assure herself that the
bank or store or government services website she thinks she’s using is genuine, because the
architecture still breaks the ‘authentication’ pathway between the user and the remote system.”).
54. See Moglen & Choudhary, supra note 53 (“[T]he poor will be comprehensively
surveilled by Facebook, losing any shred of personal privacy, while the rich using the real Internet
do not route all their traffic through Facebook.”).
55. See Jon Brodkin, Apple Music Exempted from T-Mobile’s Data Limits and Throttling,
ARS TECHNICA (July 28, 2015), http://arstechnica.com/business/2015/07/apple-music-exemptedfrom-t-mobiles-data-limits-and-throttling/; Marcus Wohlsen, Free Mobile Data Plans Are Going
to Crush the Startup Economy, WIRED (Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/08/freemobile-data-plans-are-going-to-crush-the-startup-economy/.
56. Brodkin, supra note 55.
57. Nick Statt, T-Mobile Will Let You Stream Netflix and HBO Without Using Up Your Data,
VERGE (Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.theverge.com/2015/11/10/9704482/t-mobile-uncarrier-bingeon-netflix-hbo-streaming.
58. See id.
59. See VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 5, at 9 (arguing that, while zero-rating programs that
discriminate within a class should be banned, those like Music Freedom that neither discriminate
nor charge the edge provider could be evaluated instead on a case-by-case basis).
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the later release of Binge On, however, Professor van Schewick argued that
the program creates barriers to innovation because it effectively forces new
entrants to the video streaming market to strike a deal with T-Mobile and
comply with its technical requirements. 60
3. Sponsored Data
The sponsored-data paradigm is one where a party pays the data
charges for delivery of its own content. AT&T pioneered the idea through
its U.S. “sponsored-data” plan in January 2014: its model allows marketers
to pay the data charges associated with app trials or video advertisements
and thereby avoid consuming subscribers’ monthly data allotments. 61
mCent pushed the model in a more ambitious direction when it
launched its own sponsored-data program in the developing world later in
2014. 62 Major online firms like Amazon and Twitter now pay the data
charges for mCent users to either view advertisements or use free versions
of their apps, as do several regional competitors and smaller developers.63
But the companies are obliged to pay for more than just their own data:
every time a user views an ad or downloads a sponsored app, the sponsor
pays for a data credit that the user can use to browse any site on the
Internet. 64 The user who views a one megabyte ad, for example, could earn
two megabytes to be applied towards browsing other parts of the web. 65
Just one year after launch, mCent had already partnered with 237 mobile
carriers around the globe, and in the process had become one of India’s
largest platforms for advertising apps, second only to Facebook. 66
In another variant on the sponsored-data approach, firms have begun to
propose zero-rated applications platforms. Imagine a version of Apple’s
App Store or Google’s own Android market where developers could simply
pay the data charges so that users could download and use their apps for

60. See Marguerite Reardon, Is T-Mobile’s Unlimited Video Streaming Actually Good for
Consumers?, CNET (Nov. 13, 2015) (quoting van Schewick), http://www.cnet.com/news/is-tmobiles-unlimited-video-streaming-service-really-good-for-consumers/.
61. AT&T Introduces Sponsored Data for Mobile Data Subscribers and Businesses, AT&T
(Jan.
6,
2014),
http://www.att.com/gen/pressroom?pid=25183&cdvn=news&newsarticleid=37366.
62. See Parmy Olson, This App Is Cashing in on Giving the World Free Data, FORBES (July
29,
2015),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2015/07/29/jana-mobile-data-facebookinternet-org/; David Talbot, Facebook’s Controversial Free-App Plan Gets Competition, MIT
TECH. REV. (May 6, 2015), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/537201/facebookscontroversial-free-app-plan-gets-competition/.
63. See Olson, supra note 62.
64. See id.
65. Id.
66. Janelle Nanos, Mobile App Marketplace Jana Pushes Deeper into the Developing World,
BOSTON GLOBE (May 6, 2015), http://www.betaboston.com/news/2015/05/06/with-a-newloyalty-program-mobile-app-marketplace-jana-pushes-deeper-into-the-developing-world/.
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free. Google announced its plans for this sort of platform last year,67 and
Microsoft Research has independently developed bill-splitting technologies
that would facilitate this sort of zero rating. 68 These platforms seem to
follow in AT&T’s footsteps by requiring developers to pay only for their
own data, rather than following mCent’s model in also subsidizing generaluse Internet. This approach might make the platform more affordable for
small developers, albeit at the expense of providing users with wider access.
The mCent approach to sponsored data is interesting not only because
it subsidizes general-use Internet access, but also because it facilitates two
types of disintermediation. First, if the service is open to any developer
willing to pay its own data charges, then the zero-rating operator essentially
plays no gatekeeping role. Although wealthy firms and monetizable apps
are at an advantage, this approach removes the uncertainties and transaction
costs associated with zero-rating models that rely on the carrier’s
discretion. 69 Second, this model is one that cuts across carriers. With
conventional approaches to zero rating, Carrier X might offer one package
(say, Facebook Zero) while Carrier Y offered another (say, zero-rated
Twitter). For better or worse, the carriers would leverage these programs as
part of their marketing campaign and low-income consumers would be
splintered in their access to one service or the other. But, as mCent’s
founder Nathan Eagle has stated, the major strength of the program is that it
cuts across Internet providers: mCent has already developed the

67. See Amir Efrati, Google’s Next Bid to Lower Mobile Data Costs: Zero Rating,
INFORMATION (Feb. 13, 2015), https://www.theinformation.com/articles/Google-s-Next-Bid-toLower-Mobile-Data-Costs-Zero-Rating.
68. See Himanshu Raj, Stefan Saroiu, Alec Wolman & Jitendra Padhye, Splitting the Bill for
Mobile Data with SIMlets, Proceedings of the 14th Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems and
Applications (Feb. 26, 2013), http://research.microsoft.com/apps/pubs/default.aspx?id=197588.
69. This leveling of the playing field matters because—per the conventional net-neutrality
debate—scholars point to the transaction costs and uncertainties associated with carriers’
gatekeeping as a major impairment to entry and innovation. See, e.g., Lemley & Lessig, supra
note 14, at 945 (“Innovators are likely to be cautious about how they spend their research efforts if
they know that one company has the power to control whether that innovation will ever be
deployed.”). One might object of course that favoritism towards monetizable apps damages the
environment for innovation and free speech by small players. See, e.g., VAN SCHEWICK, supra
note 5, at 8 (calling for a ban on all zero-rating schemes that require edge-provider payments).
These concerns are mitigated somewhat by a program like mCent that also subsidizes data that can
be used at any site. Recall also that websites have always had to pay overhead. Former start-ups
like Facebook, which failed to make a profit for the first six years of business, and nonprofits like
Wikipedia, which has declined to serve advertisements on its site, have successfully raised the
funds to pay for servers, staff, and other overhead even during lean times. See David Sarno,
Facebook Reports Milestones in Cash Flow, Users, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2009),
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/sep/16/business/fi-facebook-staff16; Alana Semuels, Wikipedia’s
TIMES
(Mar.
10,
2008),
Tin-Cup
Approach
Wears
Thin,
L.A.
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/mar/10/business/fi-wikipedia10. Accordingly, the question for
sponsored data is whether it changes overhead costs so much as to make existing funding
structures inadequate.
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infrastructure to manage payments to over two hundred different mobile
carriers. 70
B. Frameworks for Comparison
To understand the structural differences between zero-rating programs,
it is helpful to delineate the services into the single-website, bundled, and
sponsored-data categories outlined above. But to evaluate the impact of
these programs, one must also consider their functional differences in terms
of their sponsorship models, site selection processes, and communications
modalities.
1. Sponsorship Models
The platforms’ sponsorship and payment systems vary in the degree of
user choice they allow. Programs like AT&T’s sponsored data or Google’s
proposed app store involve self-sponsorship, where the edge provider pays
for its own data and users can visit only the sponsored site. The mCent
platform engages in hybrid-sponsorship, where the edge provider pays for
its own data (or advertising space) while also subsidizing data that users can
apply towards the sites of their choice. One can also imagine general
sponsorship, where a benefactor pays for Internet use without promoting its
own services. The United States models this approach through its Lifeline
program, where the government subsidizes telephone service for lowincome people. 71 The following figure arranges these approaches on a
spectrum of increasing user choice:
Figure 1: Sponsorship Models. Arranged in order of increasing user
choice.

SELF-SPONSORSHIP

HYBRID

GENERAL

AT&T

mCent

Gov’t subsidies

Of course, many plans involve no payments. Wikipedia Zero and
Facebook Free Basics, for example, do not pay for traffic to their sites.
Mobile carriers instead deploy these services as either pro bono efforts or
marketing strategies. Plans like these are effectively a form of targeted
sponsorship—akin to self-sponsorship—where the carrier absorbs the
charges for sites it has partnered with.

70. See Talbot, supra note 62.
71. See Crawford, supra note 15, at 392 & nn.146–49.
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2. Site Selection
The platforms also differ in their processes for selecting which sites to
include, and these processes vary in their degree of openness to new
entrants versus centralized control by the intermediary.
Platforms
sometimes handpick the sites according to their own interests and
inclinations, like carriers do when choosing to zero-rate a single site like
Facebook or Wikipedia, or like Facebook itself did in selecting which sites
to include in the original incarnation of Internet.org. Other times, platforms
adopt a set of standards, limiting their discretion to discriminate between
sites.
Self-sponsorship programs feature straightforward selection
standards where they zero-rate any edge provider willing to pay; Free
Basics has adopted a standard with both hard rules (compliance with
technical specifications) and fuzzier guidelines (encouraging the
exploration of the wider Internet). And programs like mCent give the user
complete freedom to select any site using data credits earned through the
platform. The following figure depicts these options:
Figure 2: Site-Selection Models. Arranged in order of increasing
openness to new sites and services.

PLATFORM’S
DISCRETION

SELECTION
STANDARDS

USER’S CHOICE

Old Internet.org;
most single-website
plans

Free Basics;
sponsored data

mCent; most data
credits

3. Communications Modality
Finally, zero-rating platforms differ in the communications modalities
they facilitate. Some platforms offer only “one-to-many” communications,
where the site conveys information to the user but offers no tools for the
user to speak on her own behalf. The music- and video-streaming programs
available through T-Mobile fit this model, as do several discrete offerings
on Free Basics, such as BBC News or local weather reports. When
commentators warn that zero rating will lead consumers back to a broadcast
model of telecommunications, they highlight the possibility that mobile
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carriers will zero-rate only the one-to-many sites that that are most willing
to pay to reach their audience. 72
Other platforms offer “one-to-one” communications, where the user
can speak directly to other users. Instant-messaging and email applications
like those available through Free Basics are the clearest examples of such
services, and instant-messaging services like WhatsApp have also enjoyed
success with zero-rating. 73 Sites operating in this modality are more
interactive than one-to-many sites, but they offer little more than the digital
version of the telephone or the SMS text message.
Finally, some platforms offer “many-to-many” communications,
where any user can post information for the rest of the world to see. This
form of communication—where practically anyone can become her own
broadcaster—is one of the Internet’s unique strengths as a communications
medium. 74 Facebook offers this potential: any user can generate a personal
profile, a site for a cause or event, or a blog post to share with the rest of the
world. 75 Zero-rated Facebook users are limited, however, in their inability
to share pictures or video without paying for data. Wikipedia Zero likewise
offers the potential for many-to-many communications by allowing any
user to create or edit an encyclopedia entry. The following figure depicts
the three modalities:

72. See, e.g., Crawford, supra note 6 (arguing that with zero rating “vertical discrimination
will become the norm: the Internet as cable TV”).
73. See Carolina Rossini & Taylor Moore, EXPLORING ZERO-RATING CHALLENGES: VIEWS
FIVE
COUNTRIES
40,
55
(July
2015),
FROM
https://www.publicknowledge.org/documents/exploring-zero-rating-challenges-views-from-fivecountries.
74. As the Supreme Court articulated nearly two decades ago, “Through the use of chat
rooms, any person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther
than it could from any soapbox. Through the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups,
the same individual can become a pamphleteer.” Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S.
844, 870 (1997).
75. See Crawford, supra note 15, at 363 n.12 (identifying the rise of social networks as
“[p]erhaps the most striking (and concrete) example” of the kinds of complex human connection
facilitated by the Internet).
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increasing potential for user participation.
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***
The three-part framework outlined above offers two analytic strengths.
First, it provides a metric for assessing a program’s relative generativity, as
well as the relative weight of the net neutrality objection, as applied to that
program. On each axis, the objection should diminish as the program
moves down the spectrum: the risks are fewest when a site cannot pay for
special privileges; when the platform does not play a major gatekeeping
role; and when users are free to develop and share their own content.
Second, considering these features in concert allows us to predict the
overall impact of a zero-rating plan. A system that combined selfsponsorship with the carrier’s discretion to charge different rates to different
edge providers is one that could devolve into a payola scheme. Or, consider
a program where the government subsidized several one-to-many news and
educational sites. That program might provide a valuable information
service—educating and informing the public much as state-supported
broadcasters like the BBC have done for nearly a century. It might even be
generative to the extent it developed users’ capabilities to participate in the
public sphere. But it would not provide a communications service with the
interactive features of the open Internet.
Criticism of zero rating must take account of these different
permutations in order to home in on the practice’s actual challenges and
opportunities. Left to their own devices, carriers might pursue zero-rating
plans that maximized their private benefits at the expense of the public. But
to allow zero rating does not mean allowing self-interested carriers to
operate in a regulatory vacuum. Short of banning zero rating—as many
critics advocate—the law could intervene to steer carriers towards
arrangements that serve the public-interest goals of communications law
and away from those that harm it. The following discussion will unpack the
critics’ main arguments against zero rating while showing, contrary to these
objections, that zero rating has the potential to advance the generativity
goals that animate network neutrality.
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II. THE NET NEUTRALITY OBJECTION
Network neutrality is a policy designed to secure the benefits of a free
and open Internet. In broad strokes, it prohibits Internet carriers from
discriminating in their treatment of content from different edge providers.
It can thereby preserve user choice regarding which sites and applications to
use, encouraging competition between edge providers. It can likewise
encourage innovation by allowing diverse and numerous developers to
bring their services to the public without having to seek the permission of
the carriers. And it can facilitate democratic participation in the public
sphere by affording users with opportunities to speak or to otherwise
empower themselves, regardless of whether the carrier agrees with the
users’ speech. While commentators might differ in the weight they assign
to each of these goals, collectively these outcomes are crucial to the
Internet’s generativity. 76
The objection to zero rating is that it gives carriers the power to dictate
which sites and services will be available to the millions of people who rely
on zero-rated platforms for Internet access.77 Carriers could exercise this
power to constrain user choice to a narrow menu, and in so doing they
could undermine the openness that makes the Internet innovative and
participatory. The force of this objection is blunted, however, insofar as it
neglects the problem that makes zero rating so appealing: poorer
communities throughout the developing world lack Internet access. While
zero-rated access may be less generative than affordable access to the entire
Internet, it generally provides greater user choice—and greater possibilities
for innovation and democratic engagement—than no access at all.
A. Walled Gardens: User Choice Under Limited Competition
Critics warn that zero-rated services sacrifice the open Internet for a
walled garden. 78 The Internet as we know it today is a diverse platform
where the user can choose from millions of competing sites and services or
even launch one of her own. Many commentators worry that zero rating
will, by contrast, limit users to just the handful of sites and services the

76. See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text.
77. See Barbara van Schewick & Morgan N. Weiland, New Republican Bill Is Network
Neutrality in Name Only, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 85, 89–90 (2015). As Susan Crawford puts it,
“Can you imagine trying to launch a competitor to Facebook in a country where most of your
potential customers will have to pay data charges for your service—while the incumbent
Facebook is exempt?” Crawford, supra note 6.
78. See, e.g., Crawford, supra note 6 (“Saying that walled gardens are ‘good enough’ for
poorer people is clearly destructive.”); Malcolm, supra note 7 (“Although it may seem like a
humane strategy to offer users from developing countries crumbs from the Internet’s table in the
form of free access to walled-garden services, such service may thrive at the cost of stifling the
development of low-cost, neutral Internet access . . . .”).
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carrier has selected, with deleterious effects for consumer welfare, free
expression, and innovation.
The walled-garden concern stems from an analysis of carriers’
incentives. All else being equal, we might assume that carriers would
prefer to zero-rate sites that are profitable—including sites they own and
those willing to pay for preferential treatment. 79 Canadian cable and
Internet provider Bell Mobility offers a ready example of this temptation.
Bell provides general Internet access, but for a time it offered a special data
plan to users who wanted to use Bell’s own video-streaming service. 80 For
five dollars per month, subscribers could watch up to ten hours of content
without incurring data charges. 81 Regulators ultimately prohibited this
arrangement because Bell discriminated heavily in favor of its own content;
by some estimates “customers [were] charged up to 800% more for all other
forms of video and other Internet-based data,” making alternative services
like Netflix or YouTube much more expensive per megabyte. 82
Carriers do, of course, zero-rate sites that are in high demand among
users but not directly profitable. The carrier might choose to zero-rate
Facebook or Wikipedia, for example, as a marketing strategy in order to
attract customers even without demanding any payments. But this
possibility does little to address the concern that carriers will deploy zero
rating in ways that distort the market towards established, popular sites.
Zero rating can also skew edge providers’ own incentives: the carrier’s
walled garden is the edge provider’s captive audience. On the open
Internet, Facebook could hypothetically only demand so much from its
users before they threatened to leave for a competing social network. Not
so if Facebook is the only site the user and her friends can afford to visit.
This worry might be ameliorated to the extent that the zero-rated site
committed to provide the same quality of service to all users, ensuring that
zero-rated users would benefit from the site’s efforts to please customers
with other options. 83 The suspicion nonetheless lingers that edge providers
will find ways to segment their user base and serve poorer people an
inferior experience with more advertisements, less privacy and security, or a
less robust set of communications tools. The case in point being
79. See generally Crawford, supra note 15, at 372 (“Both telephony and cable companies
have become anxious to ensure that they have the ability to ‘monetize’ their Internet access
networks by discriminating in favor of the voice and other applications they provide.”); Brett M.
Frischmann & Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality and the Economics of an Information
Superhighway: A Reply to Professor Yoo, 47 JURIMETRICS J. 383, 410–16 (2007) (detailing
carriers’ incentives to discriminate in favor of vertically integrated services).
80. Bell Mobility Inc., Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission
Decision 2015-26 at ¶ 46 (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2015/2015-26.pdf.
81. Id. at ¶ 6.
82. Id. at ¶ 37.
83. Recall that Wikipedia Zero has committed itself to offering the same site to all users. See
supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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Facebook’s prior refusal to support encryption on Internet.org: as
gatekeeper of an applications platform, Facebook prohibited other sites and
services from implementing features that would better protect users’
privacy. 84
The walled-garden critique highlights serious dangers, but it paints
with too broad a brush. Whether zero rating allows for user choice or
advances consumer welfare depends on the baseline for comparison; a
walled garden will usually prove better than no garden at all, and it is
difficult to maintain that someone who otherwise lacks Internet access
experiences less choice as a result of gaining the option to browse articles
on Wikipedia or send messages on Facebook. For the walled-garden
argument to have real bite, one has to argue that zero rating displaces
opportunities for users to gain access to the wider Internet. 85
Differences between zero-rating programs also bear on whether the
walled-garden critique carries weight. On one end of the spectrum, walledgarden problems loom large if the carrier selects edge providers behind
closed doors on the basis of undisclosed criteria. The specter of payola and
sweetheart deals, moreover, suggests that the carrier may select sites that
advance its private interests regardless of the effects on consumers or
competition. Bell Mobility demonstrated these risks when it offered its
own online video data at one price but charged eight times as much for
competing services like Netflix and YouTube.86 On the other hand, some
zero-rating programs have no walls to speak of. Consider mCent: the user
may apply data credits to use any site or app she chooses.
The problem of constrained user choice online is also not unique to the
zero-rating context. Successful edge providers often rely on network
effects to attract and retain users. Facebook is attractive because of the size
and breadth of the existing user base; Google optimizes its algorithms by
analyzing billions of web searches each day; and Wikipedia features a wide
range of high-quality articles because of the combined talent and efforts of
its volunteer editors. 87 These network effects create a positive feedback
loop where the edge provider is attractive as the result of its users, which
allows the site to attract new users, which makes the site even stronger.
Some platforms are also sticky in that they make it difficult for users to
transfer to another service. Facebook is once again a prime example. 88 One

84. See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text.
85. Part II.D, infra, considers this argument.
86. See supra notes 80–82 and accompanying text.
87. See Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust and Social Networking, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1771,
1787–88 (2012).
88. See, e.g., James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1192–95
(2009) (detailing this concern while articulating the privacy risks of a more open system); Yana
Welinder, A Face Tells More than a Thousand Posts: Developing Face Recognition Privacy in
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can leave Facebook easily enough, but Facebook does not provide tools for
the user to transfer her contact list, photos, and other content she has
generated. Likewise, Facebook is not interoperable with other social
networking sites or messaging services. So the ex-Facebook user cannot
send messages to her Facebook friends from the Google+ social network.
Together, the network effects and these sticky features help to insulate
incumbent edge providers against competitors even without the benefits of
fast lanes, free lanes, or other formal departures from neutrality. 89 Given
these constraints on competition, the “open” Internet may already resemble
a walled garden more than we would care to admit. Reformers who sought
to ban zero rating without addressing these other factors might therefore
sacrifice the potential benefits of zero rating without meaningfully
enhancing user choice.
B. Innovation
One key strength of net neutrality’s nondiscrimination principle is that
innovators can offer new services without seeking permission from an
Internet carrier.90 This approach disallows the sort of protectionism that
might prevail if carriers could ban applications that went against their
business interests—it stops phone operators from limiting voice-over-IP
services like Skype that compete with phone service; likewise, it stops cable
Internet carriers from discriminating against Netflix, YouTube, and other
competitors in the market for video programming. It also means that
entrepreneurs are all but guaranteed the chance to compete in the market
without the risk of a premature veto by a mobile executive, preserving their
incentives to develop new services. 91 Critics predict that zero rating would
introduce gatekeepers with this sort of veto power and thereby stifle
innovation.

Social Networks, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 165, 219 (2012) (“The threat of losing the online
identities that users have built up over the years further contributes to user lock-in.”).
89. Speaking to lock-in’s deleterious effects on competition, Lilian Edwards and Ian Brown
conclude that lock-in effects explain why “users will put up with a bad deal rather than make the
effort to replicate all their personal data and ‘friends’ connections elsewhere.” Data Control and
Social Networking: Irreconcilable Ideas?, in HARBORING DATA: INFORMATION SECURITY, LAW,
AND THE CORPORATION 202, 226 (Andrea M. Matwyshyn ed., 2009).
90. See sources cited supra note 14.
91. See VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 14, at 348 (“[A]rchitectures that force innovators to
contract or otherwise coordinate with a network provider before they can innovate . . . constrain
independent innovators’ ability and incentives to start a new project.”); Lemley & Lessig, supra
note 14, at 945 (“Innovators are likely to be cautious about how they spend their research efforts if
they know that one company has the power to control whether that innovation will ever be
deployed.”).
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1. Barriers to Entry
Zero rating poses the greatest threat to innovation where the platform
owner handpicks which services to include. There are many reasons to
question the effectiveness of this gatekeeping model for innovation online.
Given the heterogeneity of users’ preferences—and the reality that it is
difficult to identify the most socially desirable services in advance—the
most effective approach to innovation on the Internet is arguably the one
that allows the greatest diversity of contributors.92 The gatekeeper model
stifles this sort of diversity: the transaction costs of negotiating with a
gatekeeper and the risk that the carrier will arbitrarily reject the application
for reasons other than its merit would discourage third parties from
investing their time or money in developing new apps.93 Even a sponsoreddata system, where the entrepreneur merely had to pay for the data
associated with her app, might deter innovators who were uncertain as to
whether their offering would be profitable enough to cover the costs of
entry. 94
Higher barriers to entry are particularly troubling to those who wish to
promote entry by local developers. Some scholars and neutrality advocates
argue that the ideal telecommunications policy for the developing world
would be one where locally developed alternatives to Facebook and
Wikipedia could rise and flourish.95 Zero rating seems to interfere with this
goal insofar as established U.S. companies—like those that have so far had
the greatest success in zero-rating their services—are systematically better
equipped than local startups to meet carriers’ demands. 96
Despite these concerns, zero rating may nonetheless hold the potential
to foster greater diversity in the marketplace for app innovation in the
developing world. To be sure, developers who operate in a zero-rated
market must negotiate whatever barriers the platform has put in place,
92. See VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 14, at 351.
93. See supra note 91.
94. This concern is not limited to the developing world. Commentators also worry that
offerings like T-Mobile’s Music Freedom and Verizon’s Custom may create obstacles to market
entry in the United States. See Wohlsen, supra note 55.
95. See, e.g., Ramos, supra note 22 (exploring the complications that zero rating raises for
local software developers in developing markets).
96. The same strengths, however, also better equip U.S. edge providers to enter the market
and compete even in the absence of zero rating. As Anupam Chander chronicles in his recent
book, The Electronic Silk Road, the success of U.S. edge providers is attributable to speechprotective laws, users’ trust in the security of U.S.-based servers relative to servers housed
elsewhere (at least prior to Edward Snowden’s revelations regarding NSA surveillance), and the
abundance of venture capital and software engineering talent in Silicon Valley. See ANUPAM
CHANDER, THE ELECTRONIC SILK ROAD: HOW THE WEB BINDS THE WORLD TOGETHER IN
COMMERCE 55–58, 194 (2013). Encouragement of local innovation would have to go beyond a
ban on zero rating to consider strategies to replicate these factors for local developers. For
example, a region that sought to jumpstart local development might affirmatively zero-rate local
developers’ apps to give them a fighting chance against U.S. edge providers.
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incurring transaction costs as well as potential data sponsorship costs. But
in the absence of zero rating, developers may have overlooked these
markets entirely because the populations were offline. Zero-rating schemes
might therefore contribute to the diversity of apps by bringing these markets
into existence and encouraging developers to consider the needs of users
who would otherwise be ignored.
Centralized zero-rated applications platforms—like mCent or
Facebook Free Basics—may also offer unexpected advantages to new
developers. Platforms like these reduce transaction costs relative to a
system where each app developer has to negotiate with carriers directly.
The transaction costs imposed by the gatekeepers are also offset by benefits
that arise from the creation of standardized markets where users and
developers can come together. On this point, the history of the iPhone’s
app store is instructive. Jonathan Zittrain and other commentators warned
that widespread adoption of the iPhone would undermine the generativity of
the open Internet because the iPhone was a closed system where Apple
could unilaterally exclude third-party apps. 97 In practice, however, Apple
allowed many third-party developers onto the iPhone and paved the way for
a thriving market in smartphone apps. 98 By decreasing the transaction costs
for developers to offer their products to users, moreover, the model has
arguably lowered barriers to entry and made it easier than ever before for
third-party software developers to reach an audience. The iPhone proved
itself drastically more generative than the non-smartphones it replaced.
Zero-rated access, despite its introduction of gatekeepers, has similar
potential to spur a new ecosystem for apps that serve the needs of poor
communities.
2. The Generative Social Layer
We do the Internet a disservice if we locate its innovative potential
exclusively in the development of new apps. Susan Crawford challenged
her fellow communications law scholars nearly a decade ago to move past
97. See ZITTRAIN, supra note 16, at 2 (“Whereas the world would innovate for the Apple II,
only Apple would innovate for the iPhone.”).
98. See James Grimmelmann & Paul Ohm, Dr. Generative or: How I Learned to Stop
Worrying and Love the iPhone, 69 MD. L. REV. 910, 923 (2010) (“The iPhone is a hotbed of
creative tinkering; people are doing amazing things with it.”). Over one million third-party apps
now compete for recognition in the bustling market for iPhone apps. See Sarah Perez, iTunes App
Store Now Has 1.2 Million Apps, Has Seen 75 Billion Downloads to Date, TECHCRUNCH (June 2,
2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/06/02/itunes-app-store-now-has-1-2-million-apps-has-seen-75billion-downloads-to-date/. Because the iPhone is so adaptable that it can compete with devices
as varied as MP3 players, portable gaming consoles, and video cameras, it also forces other device
manufacturers to innovate or else fall into obsolescence. See Grimmelmann & Ohm, supra, at 924
(“Just as the Internet forced ‘any organization offering entertainment or information’ to rethink its
business, the iPhone is doing the same for anyone making computer hardware or software.”
(footnote omitted)).
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their preoccupation with apps to examine the kinds of complex
communications the network is capable of facilitating. 99 Even if our metric
is economic growth, she explains, the key innovations often occur at the
social layer of the network:
The human relations made possible by the Internet are capable of
producing enormously diverse ideas (ideas in the form of new
niches, new roles, and new understandings of information) and
allowing them to be disseminated on a large scale, thus triggering
crucial economic growth that will benefit society as a whole.100
In other words, the value of the network may emerge as a consequence
of the network’s capacity to match people with socially productive ideas
and resources that they could not have found via other communication
modalities. 101 This metric—which accounts for the economic benefits to
the user—may be particularly appropriate in speaking about the good that
competing approaches to Internet access might do for low-income people in
the developing world.
Zero rating is poised to facilitate these sorts of complex interactions:
popular zero-rated services like Facebook and Twitter provide extremely
powerful communications tools. 102 There is little doubt, moreover, that
users on zero-rated platforms will find new ways to interact and
communicate beyond what the platform owners intend. Thrifty users in
India already leverage “free” telephone service—by making a call but
disconnecting before anyone answers—as a code to perform such varied
communicative tasks as expressing affection to a loved one or requesting a
bank balance. 103 With respect to zero rating itself, creative Wikipedia Zero
users in Angola have already found ways to pass messages or even pirate
99. See Crawford, supra note 15, at 380 (“[T]he application-layer perspective misses what is
most important about online communications: complex human relationships.”).
100. Id. at 364.
101. Note the resemblance between this way of thinking about the value of the network and
Yochai Benkler’s description for why peer-production is such a productive modality:
It is not only, or even primarily, that more people can participate in production. The
widely distributed model of information production will better identify who is the best
person to produce a specific component of a project . . . . With enough uncertainty as to
the value of various productive activities and enough variability in the quality of
information inputs and human creative talent vis-à-vis any set of production
opportunities, coordination and continuous communications among the pool of
potential producers and consumers can generate better information about the most
valuable productive actions and the best human agents available at a given time.
Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 414
(2002) (emphasis omitted).
102. Cf. Crawford, supra note 15, at 363 n.12 (identifying the rise of social networks as
“[p]erhaps the most striking (and concrete) example” of the kinds of complex human connection
facilitated by the Internet).
(Aug.
17,
2013),
103. A.A.K.,
Marketing
a
Missed
Call,
ECONOMIST
http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2013/08/mobile-advertising-india.
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entire films using free Wikipedia bandwidth.104 The following Part
examines zero rating’s pitfalls and promises at the social layer in greater
depth by reference to its impact on democratic participation.
C. Democratic Participation
A third objection to zero rating stems from its effects on democratic
participation, or users’ opportunities for free expression and their ability to
prepare for engagement in the public sphere through education and related
avenues of self-empowerment. From this perspective, one risk of zero
rating is that carriers might prioritize sponsored commercial messages over
users’ own speech. T-Mobile’s Binge On service calls this concern to mind
in featuring commercial content from networks like HBO while excluding
platforms like YouTube that are more open to users’ personal expression. 105
A related concern is that platforms like Facebook’s Free Basics might
dampen expression by abusing their central location in the network.
Because programs like Free Basics direct all their users’ traffic through
Facebook’s servers, Facebook has the opportunity to engage in
comprehensive surveillance of its users’ online activities.106 This becomes
a problem for democratic participation when we consider the capacity for
online surveillance to normalize behavior and dull cultural and political
engagement. 107
The analysis of this problem nonetheless follows the same basic
pattern as the more general discussion of walled gardens above. 108 The
major zero-rating programs in the developing world tend to provide
communicative services that enhance users’ prospects to participate in the
larger public sphere. Consider the much-criticized Facebook Zero program.
Despite being limited to just one text-based site, it provides users with a
suite of tools that allow them to send messages; create groups and events to
explore cultural, political, or economic interests; and connect with other
users across the globe.109 Indeed, one of the attractions of a platform like
104. Jason Koebler, Angola’s Wikipedia Pirates Are Exposing the Problems with Digital
Colonialism, MOTHERBOARD (Mar. 23, 2016), http://motherboard.vice.com/read/wikipedia-zerofacebook-free-basics-angola-pirates-zero-rating.
105. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
106. See Moglen & Choudhary, supra note 53.
107. See JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY
OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 151 (2012) (tracing the relationship between privacy and artistic and
intellectual engagement); Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 404 (2008)
(“Thoroughgoing surveillance, whether by public or private actors, has a normalizing and stifling
effect.”).
108. See supra Part II.A.
109. These platforms can be especially potent in promoting free speech and democratic
participation. Recall the instrumental role that platforms like Facebook and Twitter have played
in exposing state brutality and facilitating political uprising under oppressive political regimes.
See, e.g., Rebecca J. Rosen, So, Was Facebook Responsible for the Arab Spring After All?,
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Facebook is that it leaves space for users to share their own thoughts and to
post information from other sites. 110
Zero rating’s appeal from the perspective of democratic participation,
moreover, is not limited to its communications tools. Programs like
Wikipedia Zero educate people about the world; women’s rights apps like
those featured on Facebook Free Basics help people overcome
subordination on the basis of gender; and a zero-rated mobile banking app
could help disadvantaged users achieve greater financial stability. Tools
like these have the potential to empower more of the world’s population to
participate in political, economic, and cultural life, both online and off. The
critics’ argument cannot be that zero-rated services like these fail to
enhance users’ participatory opportunities; the real objection must be that
they threaten to displace other, better approaches for bringing underserved
communities into the public sphere.
Centralized surveillance presents its own thorns. To be sure, users in
the developed world routinely trade their privacy in exchange for “free”
services from firms like Facebook and Google.111 And it is not immediately
apparent why pervasive monitoring by a firm like Facebook is more
dangerous than the same sort of surveillance conducted by local mobile
carriers; a wealthy global firm based in the United States might be more
willing than a local firm to resist illegitimate government requests for
consumers’ records. 112 But one need not be an apologist on private
surveillance to defend zero rating: we should insist on regulation that
protects user privacy on zero-rated platforms. 113
D. The Future of the Internet
Zero rating’s short-term benefits are difficult to dispute. The practice
might nonetheless be problematic, some argue, because it threatens to erode

ATLANTIC (Sept. 3, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/09/so-wasfacebook-responsible-for-the-arab-spring-after-all/244314/.
110. Cf. ZITTRAIN, supra note 16, at 95 (arguing that even a “closed” blog is generative in its
content because users enjoy “the opportunity to configure a blog for nearly any purpose—group
commentary, seeking help finding a lost camera, expressing and then sorting and highlighting
various political opinions”); Salil K. Mehra, Paradise Is a Walled Garden? Trust, Antitrust, and
User Dynamism, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 889 (2011) (arguing that the goal in regulating “walled
gardens” is to protect user dynamism).
111. See generally Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Jan Whittington, Free: Accounting for the Costs of
the Internet’s Most Popular Price, 61 UCLA L. REV. 606 (2014) (describing and criticizing this
fixation on free services).
112. Recall for example Google’s resistance to the U.S. government’s subpoena for search
data to be used for law-enforcement purposes. See Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 674
(N.D. Cal. 2006).
113. See infra Part IV.A.4.
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the foundations of the open Internet. 114 Critics warn that zero rating might
cannibalize the political will and resources that would go towards other
options. Global pressure to close the digital divide is mounting: developing
nations like Kenya have begun to devote resources towards bringing
telecommunications infrastructure to underserved rural areas; 115 NGOs and
universities are pushing for the United Nations to recognize access to
information as both a human right and a cornerstone for sustainable
development; 116 and private companies like Facebook and Google explore
high-tech solutions like delivery of Wi-Fi by drone or high-altitude
balloon. 117 For governments, NGOs, or private actors to devote resources
to a problem, however, there must be a critical mass of constituents (or
customers) to demand these efforts. The concern with zero rating is that
people might be placated by walled-garden access. Already the critics
worry that many first-time Internet users are confusing access to
Internet.org or even Facebook alone as access to the Internet, which may
lull them into thinking the fight is won. 118 Popular will might fizzle out if
the trend continues.
Critics also flag the possibility that zero rating will become the new
normal for Internet access. Much as domestic consumers overwhelmingly
114. See, e.g., Crawford, supra note 6 (“[T]he cost of such services is the future of the
Internet. Those users may never move to ‘real’ Internet access, satisfied with their ‘free’ access to
a walled garden of chosen services.”); MacDonald, supra note 7 (“[O]ffering services that don’t
count against data caps . . . tips the balance in favour of zero-rated services, effectively salting the
earth of low-cost net neutral alternatives in the future.”); Malcolm, supra note 7 (arguing that
zero-rated services may come “at the cost of stifling the development of low-cost, neutral Internet
access in those countries for decades to come”).
115. See Rebecca Wanjiku, Kenya Starts Universal Service Fund Implementation, IT WORLD
(Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.itworld.com/article/2693785/networking-hardware/kenya-startsuniversal-service-fund-implementation.html.
116. See LYON DECLARATION ON ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
http://www.lyondeclaration.org/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2016).
117. See Yael Maguire, Announcing the Connectivity Lab at Facebook, FACEBOOK CODE
(Mar.
27,
2014),
https://code.facebook.com/posts/1461780544052806/announcing-theconnectivity-lab-at-facebook/ (describing Facebook’s efforts to deploy Internet through solarpowered drones and infrared lasers); Project Loon, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/loon/ (last
visited Jan. 24, 2016) (“Project Loon is a network of balloons traveling on the edge of space,
designed to connect people in rural and remote areas, help fill coverage gaps, and bring people
back online after disasters.”); see also David Reed, Jennifer Haroon & Patrick S. Ryan,
Technologies and Policies to Connect the Next Five Billion, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1205 (2014)
(cataloging other technological proposals to extend Internet access).
118. See, e.g., Open Letter to Mark Zuckerberg, supra note 8. On this point, zero rating’s
critics sometimes point to survey data showing that many people in Indonesia and Nigeria are
confused. Leo Mirani, Millions of Facebook Users Have No Idea They’re Using the Internet,
QUARTZ (Feb. 9, 2015), http://qz.com/333313/milliions-of-facebook-users-have-no-idea-theyreusing-the-internet/. These users say they use Facebook, but that they do not use the Internet. Id.
This data may be troubling as a window into Facebook’s capture of users’ attention, or into users’
Internet literacy (anyone using Facebook is technically also using the Internet). But counter to the
proposition for which it is often cited, this data also demonstrates that users correctly recognize
that Internet access is not equivalent to mere Facebook use.
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prefer free services online (despite paying with our attention when we view
advertisements, or with our data when we consent to Orwellian “privacy
policies”), 119 users who become acclimated to zero rating may come to
expect it from all of their services. Consumer demand, in other words,
might militate in favor of zero rating as a permanent solution rather than as
an interim measure to address disparities in Internet access.
Even if we set our sights on affordable, neutral access as the end goal,
however, zero rating could lend a crucial stepping stone. For starters, it
could generate the grassroots political and economic demand to push for
more comprehensive reforms. One of the greatest barriers to Internet
adoption, besides price, is that people lack information about the Internet
and how it might be relevant to their lives. 120 At the same time, poor
communities in the developing world are often risk-averse when outsiders
try to introduce new goods or services. 121 The opportunity costs of
investing time and money into something untested can be prohibitive. Zero
rating provides a free sample that can encourage people to actually try the
services. 122 And in bringing a critical mass of local users onto the same
platform—say, Facebook—zero rating could demonstrate in a concrete way
how the service would be useful.
Sponsored data plans might be especially useful for development
purposes. In regions where few people can afford to pay for their own data
traffic, edge providers who sponsor their own data can provide a revenue
stream for improving the communications infrastructure. The funding
could lead to more reliable signals, better coverage for rural areas and other
remote communities, faster speeds, or perhaps even cheaper data prices. In
weak markets the carriers will likely be tempted to pocket the revenues

119. See Hoofnagle & Whittington, supra note 111.
120. See RAUL L. KATZ & TAYLOR A. BERRY, DRIVING DEMAND FOR BROADBAND
NETWORKS AND SERVICES 29–31 (2014).
121. Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak, Puneet Dwivedi, Robert Bailis, Lynn Hildemann & Grant
Miller, Low Demand for Nontraditional Cookstove Technologies, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI.
10815 (2012) (documenting low-income people’s reluctance to invest in new technologies even
when they are marketed as more efficient or healthier than traditional alternatives).
122. Many scholars have rightly identified the seductive power of “free” goods and services as
creating problems for consumer law. See, e.g., Hoofnagle & Whittington, supra note 108;
Kristina Shampanier, Nina Mazar & Dan Ariely, Zero as a Special Price: The True Value of Free
Products, 26 MARKETING SCI. 742 (2007); John M. Newman, Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets:
Foundations, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 149 (2015). The zero price may nonetheless be capable of doing
some good in getting people to try services that they subsequently come to find beneficial. See
Daniel A. Lyons, Innovations in Mobile Broadband Pricing, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. 453, 487 (2015)
(“[S]uch programs help introduce people to the Internet . . . helping ensure that if they continue to
decline full Internet access, it is not because of lack of familiarity with the product.”). Insofar as
the zero price induces people to use Internet services frequently, moreover, it may help facilitate
the positive externalities or “spillovers” that scholars associate with many Internet platforms. See
generally Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 14.
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rather than invest them in infrastructure, but we ought not concede this loss
without first considering corrective regulation. 123
Carriers’ own incentives also work in favor of the open Internet.
Recall that edge providers like Facebook (with Free Basics) pay nothing for
the data they consume. The carrier hopes to recoup some of the costs by
using the zero-rated service as an enticement to attract new subscribers.
But once a user joins the network, the carrier only makes money on the deal
if it can convince people to pay for data to visit sites outside the zero-rated
plan. Insofar as these carriers might be preying on the infirmities of lowincome people to subscribe to services they do not need, they ought to be
admonished. 124 But it is hard to make out a net neutrality problem: the
carriers’ goal is to convince users to subscribe to data plans for the full
Internet. If the users can actually afford the plans and enjoy the use of the
network, then the carrier’s incentives and the public good will have aligned.
***
As the iPhone demonstrates, the future of the Internet is notoriously
difficult to predict. 125 Drawing on familiar net neutrality arguments, zero
rating’s critics raise sobering objections to carriers’ discrimination between
sites and the potential consequences for user choice, innovation, and users’
participation in the public sphere. But zero rating may prove generative for
communities who otherwise lack Internet access, and it might even increase
political demand for affordable data. Any attempt to predict zero rating’s
likely outcomes is constrained by the lack of information to confirm, rebut,
or guide the analysis. In the face of these unknowns, regulators should
neither ban the practice nor allow it to proceed unrestricted. As the next
Part argues, the better course is to pursue regulatory designs that generate
better information on zero rating and its place in telecommunications
policy.
III. REGULATORY DESIGN FOR ZERO RATING
Zero rating poses novel questions for communications law, but it also
presents challenges that are all too familiar for the modern administrative
state. Lawmakers must decide how to treat an emerging business model
with limited information about either the practice’s costs and benefits or the
likely effects of possible regulation. I argue that, in these circumstances,
regulators should pursue experimental—and experimentalist—modes of

123. Part IV.B.3, infra, returns to these regulatory possibilities.
124. See supra note 122.
125. See supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text.
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regulation so as to better identify the advantages and drawbacks of different
approaches to zero rating.
A. Experimental Regulation
All regulation is to some degree a policy experiment: enactment of the
regulation gives us the opportunity to observe the law’s effect on the
world. 126 But not all these experiments yield actionable results. Even if we
can discern the law’s effects, we often have little information on whether
alternative laws would be better or worse.127 And political will to revisit
the law may be lacking even if it proves ineffective. 128 Experimental
regulation, as a mode of lawmaking, seeks to conduct policy experiments
that better isolate the effects of the regulation in question; provide some
means of comparing the outcomes of different interventions; and include
mechanisms that allow policymakers to act on the basis of their findings.
The following discussion examines how regulators might utilize controlled
experiments and “experimentalist” regulation to pursue these policylearning goals in the context of zero rating. 129
1. Controlled Policy Experiments
Randomized, controlled experiments are the gold standard for
discerning the effects of competing policies.130 Regulators might therefore
wish to engage in controlled experiments to test different rules for zero
rating. They might, for example, investigate whether requiring zero-rating
platforms to supplement their walled gardens with a few megabytes of
unrestricted data—like mCent already does—impacts users’ browsing
habits, the costs of entry for new services, or the development of users’
educational, economic, or political capabilities. Along similar lines, states
might wish to commission studies directly on the effect of contentious zero126. See generally Yair Listokin, Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480, 491
(2008) (“A policy’s performance in one period yields information about its probable performance
in the next period.”).
127. See Michael Abramowicz, Ian Ayres & Yair Listokin, Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA. L.
REV. 929, 938–39 (2011).
128. See id. at 985–87; Listokin, supra note 126, at 539–46.
129. For an introduction to experimental regulation, see SOFIA RANCHORDÁS,
CONSTITUTIONAL SUNSETS AND EXPERIMENTAL LEGISLATION: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
212 (2014); Abramowicz et al., supra note 127; and Listokin, supra note 126. On experimentalist
regulation—an administrative regime where local units make autonomous decisions subject to
common coordination and monitoring—see, for example, Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); and Charles F.
Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100
GEO. L.J. 53 (2011). Lisa Ouellette has done an extraordinary job demonstrating the strengths and
weaknesses of each approach in her recent article applying these frameworks to patent law. See
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65 (2015).
130. Abramowicz et al., supra note 127, at 933.
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rating platforms: they could, for example, test Facebook’s claim that Free
Basics users are more likely than their peers to subscribe to a data plan for
full Internet access.131
There are limits, however, to what regulators can hope to achieve
through controlled experiments in the telecommunications sector. One set
of limits arises from the ethical and political concerns that come from
treating people as guinea pigs. 132 These concerns loom especially large in
studies of low-income people, who may lack the political clout to protect
themselves against abusive studies. Indeed, if an experimental design
arbitrarily denied benefits to some people, it might exacerbate the ill effects
of the digital divide for that group.133 Generally, however, a carefully
designed and administered study will be able to overcome ethical concerns.
While a study might seem to arbitrarily withhold benefits—giving some the
benefit of free Internet while denying it to others—it does so for the future
benefit of the participants as well as the wider community. When the study
causes no lasting harm but has the potential to deliver future benefits to the
study population itself, conducting the experiment is more ethical than
prolonging the status quo. 134
Another set of problems is administrative in nature: temporal and
geographic constraints make it difficult to implement controlled
experiments on Internet policy. 135 Temporally, an effective study in the
telecommunications space must be concluded relatively quickly. As a study
drags on, the data may become skewed by participant attrition, spillovers in
access and information from others who are not participating in the same
study, or larger trends in the deployment and use of the Internet. 136 Given
how quickly the market for online sites and services changes, moreover, the

131. There is a surprising dearth of published social-science research on the effects of zero
rating on users despite the fact that Facebook Zero launched over five years ago. One notable
exception is Amba Kak’s recently published master’s dissertation, which studied the attitudes of
low-income urban youth in Delhi with respect to zero rating and other low-cost data plans. See
generally AMBA KAK, THE INTERNET UN-BUNDLED: LOCATING THE USER’S VOICE IN THE
DEBATE ON ZERO RATING (2015), http://www.savetheinternet.in/files/amba-kak-thesis.pdf. Her
study found that this audience saw zero-rated plans as inferior to full access and gravitated
towards all-access data plans “even when the latter are more costly or for shorter duration.” Id. at
49.
132. See Abramowicz et al., supra note 127, at 963–67; Ouellette, supra note 129, at 94.
133. See Sylvain, supra note 12, at 28 (describing the distributional welfare effects of unequal
access to the network over time).
134. Accord Ouellette, supra note 129, at 94 (“While any randomized policy experiment
should be sensitive to ethical concerns, especially when human lives are at stake, I think that it is,
if anything, unethical not to pursue such experiments.”). Likewise, in the sphere of domestic
lawmaking, Judge Henry Friendly once upheld states’ authority to conduct randomized policy
experiments as consistent with our normative commitment to allowing the states to act as
laboratories of democracy. See Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090, 1109 (2d Cir. 1973).
135. See generally Abramowicz et al., supra note 127, at 957–60.
136. See id.
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results of a controlled experiment today might tell us little about how to
regulate the market tomorrow.
Geographically, it can be difficult for regulators operating within a
given jurisdiction to segregate populations or its industries into comparable
study groups. 137 In other words, it may not be feasible to instruct Facebook
to treat different groups of subscribers differently within a given
jurisdiction due to the lack of comparable populations or the likelihood of
spillovers if participants live in overlapping communities.
Where
geographic factors make it difficult for regulators to subject different groups
of users to different rules, they might instead consider subjecting different
zero-rating platforms to different rules. This approach, however, raises
predictable problems of its own because observed differences between the
platforms may be due to users’ selection of the program they view as most
the attractive ex ante or due to differences inherent in the platforms. To
make the point more concretely: Free Basics and Wikipedia Zero are
different enough as programs that one would expect them to lead to
different outcomes even if regulators subjected them to the same
experimental treatment.
States might cooperate and attempt to conduct policy experiments
between jurisdictions, but this strategy carries its own comparability
problems: different social and economic conditions between nations can
complicate regulators’ attempts to isolate the effects of any given policy
intervention. Indeed, as a political matter we might expect that most states
will prefer regulatory strategies tailored to their perceived local needs.
Experimentalism provides an avenue for states to pursue tailored regulation
while still generating useful policy information.
2. Experimentalism
Experimentalism is an approach to policy learning where several
jurisdictions simultaneously coordinate their activities yet retain autonomy
to select their own policies. 138 In an experimentalist approach to zero
rating, each jurisdiction would select the legal rules it thought best achieved
the goals of telecommunications policy. To promote policy learning, these
states would pre-commit themselves to monitoring the effects of local
policy decisions, sharing the results, and defending their choice to select
one policy over another. 139 The resulting scheme would allow each
jurisdiction to pursue its choice of policies—and even to tailor the rules to
local needs and opportunities—while still offering the informational
137. See id. at 960.
138. See generally Sabel & Simon, supra note 129.
139. See id. at 78 (designating a range of governance regimes as “experimentalist to the extent
that they are designed to achieve local adaptation and aggregate learning by combining discretion
with duties to report and explain, and by pooling information”).
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benefits of comparing the results of different approaches. This approach
would also mitigate some of the geographic difficulties of experimentation
by allowing treatments to take place at the national level.
The experimentalist mode is particularly promising for zero rating for
two reasons. First, requiring states to articulate and justify their decisions
would have the discursive benefit of creating a forum for regulators to
develop the values and norms that ought to guide Internet policy. 140 Net
neutrality debates have sidestepped difficult normative questions about
priorities because advocates could historically claim that nondiscrimination
rules advance user choice, innovation, and free speech simultaneously.
Zero rating now poses harder questions. Regulators must ask, for example,
whether a “neutral” applications platform that only the wealthy can use is as
generative as a platform where developers can pay to sponsor low-income
users’ data consumption. This process could lead to a richer understanding
of what the goals of net neutrality and indeed communications law more
generally ought to be.
Second, zero rating poses a multitude of questions that require
immediate attention even though the potential solutions are untested. As
Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel have argued, experimentalism is efficient
as a means of identifying dead ends among several competing regulatory
alternatives—multiple jurisdictions can try different approaches and
compare their successes and failures—and might provide just the
winnowing tool that regulators need.141
B. Overcoming Regulatory Inertia
Policy experimentation is useful only so long as suboptimal policies
can subsequently be reversed—the public would otherwise be forced to bear
the burden of failed policies indefinitely. 142 Regulators who seek to
operationalize a policy-learning approach must therefore build flexibility
into the system so that they can update and, if necessary, reverse their
policies as their information improves. Zero rating presents three potential
reversibility problems.
The first is the general inertia that can beset any bureaucratic system.
The telecommunications regulator—be it the legislature acting directly or
an administrative agency—may neglect to revisit the issue except in case of
emergency given the many other demands on its attention. One
prescription for dealing with this sort of inertia is to enact sunset laws that
terminate the existing rule and require the decisionmaker to revisit the issue
140. See Ouellette, supra note 129, at 73 (arguing that “experimentalism’s most important
strengths may be its ability to improve the inputs (what policies should be tested?) and the metrics
(what does it means for a policy to ‘work’?)”).
141. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 129, at 316.
142. See Listokin, supra note 126, at 546–53.
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after an initial period of data collection.143 Regulators might go even
further by making their policy experiments self-executing. 144
The
conventional sunset provision allows decisionmakers to proceed however
they would like at the time the sunset triggers. The self-executing
provision, by contrast, is one that would either “specify ex ante the policy
effects of particular results, or, . . . could require independent
decisionmakers in an administrative agency to make policy changes based
on the experiment.” 145 The idea is that such a provision would pre-commit
lawmakers to actually act on the results of what they learn.
A second reversibility problem is visible through the lens of publicchoice theory. 146 Zero-rating programs already have the support of
powerful firms like Facebook who have concrete stakes in the success of
the programs. When a program like Free Basics is successful, moreover, it
may give hundreds of thousands of constituents—if not millions—a stake in
the program’s continued viability. The convergence of corporate and
popular interests into one coalition might discourage regulators from acting
in a way that interferes with previously authorized zero-rating programs
even if the data suggested the need for new policies. These concerns should
not be overstated: recall that TRAI banned Free Basics in India even after
receiving over one million emails from subscribers who supported the
program. 147 The need to hedge against the potential popularity of
temporarily authorized zero-rating programs nonetheless gives regulators
even greater reason to commit ex ante to sunset clauses and self-executing
regulatory designs.
This concern with the entrenchment of popular sites also connects with
the third reversibility problem, that of favored edge providers’ first-mover
advantages. 148 Sites like Facebook grow stronger and more appealing with
each new user due to the operation of network effects. Some of these sites
also employ lock-in tactics to prevent users from moving their contacts and
other user-generated content to a competitor.149 Sites like these may
accordingly be able to translate their initial successes under a permissive
zero-rating regime into permanent competitive advantages that will persist
regardless of the future course of regulation. Regulators who wish to
143. See RANCHORDÁS, supra note 129, at 212 (arguing that “sunset clauses and experimental
regulations allow the legislators and regulators to rethink the necessity of particular rules and their
contents in light of their effects”); Listokin, supra note 126, at 536 (arguing that sunset clauses
reduce the costs of policy reversal).
144. See Abramowicz et al., supra note 127, at 985–87.
145. Id. at 985.
146. For an introduction to the role of firms’ and individuals’ per capita stakes in determining
their political involvement, see NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING
INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 67–75 (1994).
147. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 87–89 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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counter this sort of market inertia should employ procompetitive
regulations, including measures to thwart lock-in. The next Part turns to
specific interventions that regulators should consider.
IV. REGULATORY INTERVENTIONS
A. Addressing Risks
As the foregoing discussion shows, zero rating presents many risks
and complications. Besides zero rating’s potential to distort competition
and create substantive obstacles for users and innovators, these programs
may entrench themselves in ways that render subsequent regulation
ineffective. This Article offers a series of proposals—and sometimes
counterproposals—through which regulators can confront these risks as
they engage in policy experimentation.
1. Transparency
Regulators should issue transparency rules for zero rating.
Transparency is already a fixture of domestic net neutrality rules. 150 In the
face of blocking, throttling, and other discriminatory traffic-management
practices, transparency plays an important information-forcing role. 151
When a consumer has trouble loading a site like Netflix, it is difficult for
her to determine whether the malfunction is due to a problem with Netflix’s
servers, general problems with her Internet service provider, or the result of
intentional throttling by the ISP. Regulators likewise have limited
resources to ferret out each ISP’s traffic management practices with respect
to various edge providers. Transparency rules put the onus on the carrier to
disclose these practices and may play a prophylactic role in steering carriers
away from practices that would incur public backlash.
Transparency for zero rating would take a different form. Unlike
throttling, there is no “secret” zero rating. Carriers will by default disclose
which sites they are zero-rating: they advertise the free services to attract
customers. There is, however, widespread secrecy in the arrangements
between carriers and edge providers. 152 As a precondition of allowing a
zero-rating program, regulators could require the programs to disclose
150. The D.C. Circuit Court retained the FCC’s transparency rule even when it struck down
other parts of the prior net-neutrality regime in Verizon v. F.C.C., 740 F.3d 623, 659 (D.C. Cir.
2014), and the FCC’s latest open Internet order imposes further disclosures on Internet carriers.
See Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, GN Docket No. 14-28, FCC 15-24 at ¶ 163–184
(Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n March 12, 2015).
151. See Frank Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need for Qualified
Transparency in Internet Intermediaries, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 105 (2010) (cataloguing the
problems that arise when network management practices are insulated from scrutiny).
152. Wikipedia Zero and Facebook’s Free Basics—in its most recent incarnation—are notable
for their greater transparency. See supra Parts I.A.1 and I.A.2.
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whether the edge provider is paying for data (and whether it offers the same
data prices to competing edge providers and consumers themselves), their
criteria for choosing which sites to zero-rate, and other key terms of the
arrangement. These disclosures would have two benefits. First, disclosure
of this information to regulators and the public would expose sweetheart
deals and self-dealing to immediate scrutiny and discourage firms from
pursuing them in the first place. Second, these disclosures would be a small
step towards leveling the playing field between newcomers and incumbent
edge providers. Basic information on the carriers’ pricing and selection
would make it more feasible for new edge providers to enter into their own
zero-rating deals at competitive rates.
2. Promoting Competition
The key complaints against zero rating relate to its effects on
competition: it could worsen the user experience by insulating edge
providers from competition and it could damage innovation and
entrepreneurship by erecting barriers to entry in zero-rated markets.
Several tools are available to regulators who wish to address these
concerns.
a. Fair Advertising
Regulators should prohibit unfair and deceptive advertising with
respect to zero rating. Chile has begun to address this problem through a
prohibition on zero-rated social networks. 153 Mobile carriers in Chile
advertised free access to Facebook and other social networks, but they
charged a premium for these plans: consumers paid extra for their
supposedly “free” service while competing carriers who did not engage in
the same marketing strategies lost customers. 154 In the United States, the
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has expressly condemned marketing
like this as deceptive.155 Recent research in behavioral science confirms the
wisdom of this approach; the offer of “free” service is seductive and
interferes with consumers’ ability to shop for the deal that best serves their
needs. 156
153. See generally Circular 40 of the Chilean Subsecretary of Telecommunications (Apr. 14,
2014),
http://www.subtel.gob.cl/transparencia/Perfiles/Transparencia20285/Normativas/Oficios/14oc_00
40.pdf.
154. See id.; Welinder & Schloeder, supra note 32.
155. Guide Concerning Use of the Word “Free” and Similar Representations, 36 Fed. Reg.
21,517 (Nov. 10, 1971).
156. To illustrate the point, consider a study where researchers offered participants the
opportunity to buy either a $10 or $20 Amazon gift certificate. See Shampanier et al., supra note
122. When the $10 certificate was priced at $1 (netting a gain of $9) and the $20 certificate was
priced at $8 (netting a gain of $12), over 60% of participants chose the more net-beneficial $20
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Chile nonetheless went further than necessary to remedy the problem
by preemptively banning all zero-rating of social networking sites. 157 This
approach may be worthy as a policy experiment; it will be interesting to see
whether non-social-network zero-rating programs (like Wikipedia Zero and
mCent) are able to find more mobile partners without competition from
Facebook, and to see how the exclusion shapes outcomes. But if people
find value in the communicative tools of a site like Facebook—and there
are many reasons to think they do—then regulators should also consider a
more reserved approach. They could ban the misleading advertisements
without specifically banning free social networks by following the FTC’s
approach and allowing carriers to advertise a service as “free” only if the
service is offered at its customary price. 158
b. Nondiscriminatory Pricing
Reasonable minds differ on whether edge providers should ever be
permitted to pay to zero-rate their own services. It is more difficult to
maintain, however, that mobile providers should be permitted to offer a
better price to a preferred edge provider than to their other customers. For
example, if the mobile carrier offers a better price to Facebook than to
Google, Twitter, or a newcomer, then the carrier overtly distorts the market
for Facebook’s competitive benefit. Discriminatory pricing also allows
carriers to shore up their walled gardens: carriers could offer reasonable
rates to its paid zero-rating partners but charge artificially high prices to
consumers who wanted to purchase general data plans. 159 As the prices for
general Internet access rose, more consumers would opt for the zero-rated
plans.
Regulators therefore ought to generally prohibit carriers from offering
preferred edge providers cheaper data than they offer to competing edge
providers or the general public. 160 Unpaid zero-rating presents a special
certificate. Id. at 752. When researchers dropped the price of the $10 certificate to $0 (for gains
of $10) and the price of the $20 certificate to $7 (for gains of $13), 100% of the participants chose
the free certificate. Id.
157. See supra note 153.
158. See Guide Concerning Use of the Word “Free” and Similar Representations, 36 Fed. Reg.
21,517.
159. Barbara van Schewick articulates this problem in her analysis of zero rating:
ISPs would have an incentive to lower monthly bandwidth caps or increase the per-byte
price for unrestricted Internet use in order to make it more attractive for application
providers to pay for zero-rating, harming users and providers of applications that do not
pay for exclusion from the cap.
VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 5, at 8.
160. Christopher Marsden offers a similar proposal in arguing that regulators ought to require
carriers to offer “fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory” conditions to all edge providers so as to
avoid problematic exclusivity agreements. See Christopher T. Marsden, Zero Rating and Mobile
Net Neutrality, in NET NEUTRALITY COMPENDIUM: HUMAN RIGHTS, FREE COMPETITION AND
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case of the problem. If carriers offered some zero-rated content for free
(say Facebook’s Free Basics and Wikipedia Zero), but charged other edge
providers for the privilege (say mCent), then the carriers would effectively
charge mCent a higher price. Preferential treatment of this sort ought to be
scrutinized carefully, but it might nonetheless be justified in limited
circumstances where the subsidy goes towards services that advance
substantive telecommunications policy goals like education.161
c. Payment Bans
Regulators could take the simpler and more aggressive route of
prohibiting edge providers from paying to zero-rate any data. Under this
rule, wealthier edge providers—who are usually powerful incumbents—
could not bribe their way into privileged access to developing markets.
Nonetheless, this rule is at best incomplete as a solution to favoritism for
wealthy incumbents, and at worst counterproductive.
The rule is incomplete because it does not account for the nonpayment
incentives that lead carriers to favor one edge provider over another.
Carriers might for example favor their own services and therefore give free
access only to a social network or news site that shared common
ownership. 162 Meeting this problem would require additional rules against
self-dealing. Carriers might also tend to favor powerful incumbents
because of their popular appeal: marketing campaigns will have more
traction if they advertise free Facebook and free Wikipedia than if they
advertise an obscure startup. And in practice we see that carriers are in fact
willing to offer Free Basics and Wikipedia Zero without demanding any
payments.
The payment ban could also be counterproductive from the perspective
of giving new entrants a chance in the market. While wealthy incumbents
might benefit the most from a pay-to-play system, this system gives
newcomers more of a chance to compete than one where the carrier selects
sites based solely on whether they are already popular. When edge
FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 241, 254–55 (Luca Belli & Primavera De Filippi eds., 2016).
Limited exceptions could be made for arrangements where the carrier could demonstrate that it
was in fact cheaper to deliver one edge provider’s data than another. For example, if Facebook
installed special connections to the carrier’s network—akin to a peering arrangement, see Timothy
B. Lee, Comcast’s Deal with Netflix Makes Network Neutrality Obsolete, WASH. POST: THE
SWITCH
(Feb.
23,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/wp/2014/02/23/comcasts-deal-with-netflix-makes-network-neutrality-obsolete/—and
if
these special servers reduced the carrier’s cost of data delivery per megabyte, then the carrier
might be permitted to pass these savings back to Facebook in the form of a cheaper rate. The key
regulatory intervention under these circumstances would be to require that the carrier give equal
access to edge providers who wished to install special servers like these.
161. See infra Part IV.B.1.
162. Recall Canadian cable and Internet provider Bell Mobility’s more favorable treatment of
its own streaming video service. See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text.
THE
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providers pay, moreover, they infuse the system with funds that can go
towards subsidizing other sites—as in the mCent model—or towards
improving the carrier’s communications infrastructure. These subsidies
would therefore also pave the way for new entrants to compete. Rather than
banning payment, regulators ought to consider whether there are ways to
channel payment towards promoting greater access. We return to this
possibility below with respect to the funding of network infrastructure. 163
d. Mandatory Interoperability
Social networking sites are sticky. As noted above, Facebook makes it
hard for non-Facebook users to enjoy the benefits of its large network by
refusing to make its messaging software interoperable with other social
networks, and it makes it hard for current users to leave because it lacks
tools to export content that the user has generated. 164 Regulators might
therefore be concerned that to allow zero-rated Facebook is to give
Facebook a permanent competitive advantage.
Regulators could mitigate the stickiness of these sites by imposing
interoperability requirements as a quid pro quo for authorization to zerorate. For markets where the accumulation of network effects and the
operation of lock-in mechanisms raise anticompetitive concerns—as they
do for social networking sites—the regulators could require the platform to
allow messaging to competing platforms. They could also require the
platforms to provide tools to export one’s contacts and other content, much
like domestic phone companies allow you to transfer your phone number
when you switch to a new service provider. Zero-rating platforms that
refused to implement these features could either be banned or subject to
stricter oversight than those that accommodated the interoperability norm.
3. Disintermediation of Gatekeepers
Another approach to confront the risks of zero rating is to constrain
gatekeepers’ discretion to pick winners and losers on their platform.
mCent, and now Facebook’s Free Basics, are already experimenting with
disintermediated models of zero rating. The platforms select which sites to
zero-rate by reference to either objective criteria (such as payment in the
case of mCent) 165 or subjective standards (such as Facebook’s allowance of
low-bandwidth sites that encourage use of the wider Internet).166
Regulators could encourage zero-rating platforms to disintermediate
by offering more favorable legal treatment to those who do it. While it is
163.
164.
165.
166.

See infra Part IV.B.3.
See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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difficult to develop ex ante rules specifying how disintermediation should
look for different sorts of platforms, the adoption of transparent and
impartial standards for choosing sites to zero-rate could presumptively
insulate platforms from charges of anticompetitive behavior.
Disintermediated platforms can of course present lock-in risks. Critics
worry that Free Basics will lead to a world where Facebook is the main
portal through which people access mobile apps and other sites. 167 As
discussed above, where lock-in is a risk, regulators could require the
platform to provide transfer mechanisms, for instance, to allow the user to
continue using her favorite apps on another platform even if she chooses to
divorce herself from Facebook’s ecosystem.
4. Privacy and Security
Finally, zero rating presents questions of privacy and security. While
these concerns are general to all services on the Internet, zero rating’s
critics warn that the concentration of millions of users on just a few zerorated platforms creates an especially attractive cache of data for those who
might abuse it. 168 We could push back on this objection: millions of people
in the developed world after all have entrusted their sensitive data to
Facebook or Gmail, calling into question whether concentration by zerorating is such a distinct problem. 169 And we might trust Facebook or
Google to be more technically savvy in designing a secure system, or more
legally resolute in resisting data requests from the government or the
carrier, than a local startup with fewer financial or legal resources. 170
The point remains that the users of zero-rating platforms may have few
alternatives but to put their trust in whatever sites that platform makes
available. The fiduciary duties that many cyberlaw scholars would impute
to parties like Facebook and Google are therefore especially appropriate
here given the users’ heightened vulnerabilities. 171 We should accordingly
censure Facebook for its failure to fulfill this duty when it refused to
support secure browsing on Internet.org. 172 Regulators ought to formalize
the duty by requiring zero-rated platforms to implement industry-standard
protections for both security and privacy.

167. See, e.g., Moglen & Choudhary, supra note 53.
168. See, e.g., Open Letter to Mark Zuckerberg, supra note 8 (arguing that Internet.org is
“making it easier for governments and malicious actors to surveil user traffic” because it
“provides only a handful of applications and services”); Malcolm, supra note 7 (arguing that on a
limited platform “the task of filtering and censoring content suddenly becomes so much easier”).
169. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
171. See Jack Balkin, Information Fiduciaries in the Digital Age, BALKINIZATION (Mar. 5,
2014), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/03/information-fiduciaries-in-digital-age.html.
172. Accord Open Letter to Mark Zuckerberg, supra note 8.
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Privacy and security also raise a unique concern in the zero-rating
context because the greatest threats to user data may sometimes come from
the state itself. Intelligence agencies around the world would like nothing
better than to tap into Facebook and Google to augment their surveillance
capabilities. 173 Privacy and security are therefore areas where zero-rating
reformers should push for either international governance or industry selfregulation—at least as a complement to local regulation—to account for
local governments’ potential conflicts of interest.
B. Pursuing Opportunities
Despite all its risks, regulators must not lose sight of zero rating’s
potential to advance generativity and related goals of telecommunications
policy. Effective zero-rating policy should therefore go beyond the
mitigation of risks to support affirmative measures to secure the benefits of
the network to low-income users.
1. Developing Human Capabilities
The Internet has tremendous potential to promote human
flourishing. 174 At present, when people cannot afford to access the Internet
their disadvantages are compounded because they cannot connect with the
same economic prospects, educational experiences, and opportunities to
participate in cultural and political life as those who are wealthier.175 This
means that people who cannot afford Internet access are less able to develop
the full range of capabilities necessary to achieve their potential to flourish
as individuals and as communities.
Zero rating could play a salutary role by subsidizing tools that could
enhance people’s capabilities. Regulators should therefore adopt regulatory
approaches that leave room for carriers to zero-rate services that advance
basic human rights and freedoms. There is room for experimentation in
defining what this approach entails and developing proper guidelines for the
selection of sites, but regulators could begin by seeking ways to provide
access to education (through sites like Wikipedia and distance-learning
services), economic opportunity (through job-search sites and mobile

173. See CHANDER, supra note 96, at 197 (describing the risk that repressive regimes will
attempt to co-opt corporations within their borders into becoming the surveillance arm of the
state); Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2296
(2014) (explaining how the modern surveillance state co-opts online speech platforms).
174. See, e.g., CHANDER, supra note 96, at 196 (“The Internet offers a global information
platform that should increase what Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen call human capabilities,
perhaps especially so for people in repressive societies.”).
175. See Sylvain, supra note 12, at 27–30 (detailing this problem among domestic users with
disparate access to the network).
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banking), and health (through sites like Free Basics’ Ebola advisories and
resources for expectant mothers, or through telemedicine).
In the absence of satisfactory provisioning of these services by
carriers, the state should also consider a more active role. Where the
revenues are available, governments might simply subsidize data for poorer
citizens. 176 As a less costly alternative, states might choose to sponsor
specific services—or mandate that carriers offer them for free—to promote
equal access to certain basic opportunities. In doing so these governments
would follow the path blazed by resources BBC and by U.S. public
broadcasting in carving out a free space within the communications
medium to serve the public interest.177
2. Demonstrating the Possibilities
Zero rating could also act as the bridge to introduce people to the
Internet who might otherwise lack the resources or interest to explore it. As
discussed above, one major barrier to Internet adoption besides price is lack
of awareness as to its benefits.178 Using zero rating as a free introduction
provides the means not only to dismantle this barrier, but also to plant the
seeds of grassroots demand for affordable Internet access.
One crucial caveat here is that to increase demand for the larger
Internet, zero-rating programs must be structured to show users that there is
a wealth of content outside the zero-rated walled garden. Most zero-rating
programs do this already to some degree. mCent goes furthest in providing
free data that can be used to browse any site. Wikipedia Zero does this only
insofar as Wikipedia pages heavily link to outside websites (which the user
cannot visit without paying). Social networks like Facebook also feature
links to outside articles. For their part, the carriers are motivated to select

176. Recall the U.S. government’s efforts to fund telephone service through the Lifeline
program. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
177. Neutrality advocates might bristle at this proposal insofar as it simply invites the state—
rather than the carrier—to exercise the gatekeeping role. Cyber libertarians have long attempted
to break the Internet free from state influence, see John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the
Independence of Cyberspace, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 8, 1996),
https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence, and contemporary scholars of all stripes remain
skeptical of the state’s competence any time it chooses to back specific firms. Cf. Amy
Kapczynski, Intellectual Property’s Leviathan, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 131 (2014)
(exploring this sort of skepticism of the state on both sides of contemporary intellectual-property
debates). But allowing states to favor education, jobs, and health sites is an extension of the
state’s traditional role in governing school curriculums, administering social welfare programs,
and mounting public health campaigns. The state may not execute these roles perfectly, but these
are by and large public goods that private markets tend to undersupply if left to their own devices.
If the objection were that states can never be trusted to make Internet policy, moreover, then
efforts to regulate or ban zero rating would face an even more fundamental problem insofar as it
appeals to these supposedly incompetent or captured actors.
178. See supra notes 120–122 and accompanying text.
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programs that make the Internet attractive so that they can convert zerorating customers into paying data-plan subscribers.
Regulators who seek to promote this feature of zero rating could set
minimum thresholds of outside exposure as a prerequisite to the approval of
zero-rating plans. Setting the right threshold is an empirical question: it
may be that outside links are sufficient to entice users to demand greater
access, or it may be that they need to actually see the other sites through a
subsidy like the one provided by mCent. If that were the case, regulators
might require all zero-rated platforms to provide a modicum of unrestricted
access. States should also experiment with non-zero-rating approaches to
building Internet awareness: they might for example fund Internet access
for schools and libraries. Even if these modest measures were insufficient
to secure the benefits of the Internet to marginalized users, they could lay
the groundwork for users to demand more comprehensive solutions.
3. Funding Network Infrastructure
One obstacle to the widespread deployment of affordable Internet
access is the expense of building the network in the first place. 179 To offer
high-speed Internet to a large number of people, mobile providers typically
invest in expensive capital projects like cellphone towers. In turn, the
mobile providers price their data plans at a level sufficient to allow them to
recoup these costs while still making a profit. The user is the one who foots
the bill for the network’s capacity.
Other models are available. States could of course subsidize these
projects and require the carrier to pass the savings to the consumer. The
appeal of zero rating is that it offers a means by which comparable
subsidies could come instead from the private sector. When a platform like
mCent pays to sponsor data, it steps in to pay the expense of building and
maintaining the network in place of the consumer. The benefits of
sponsored data could therefore go beyond short-term access to include the
potential long-term benefits that come from financing network
infrastructure.
Mobile carriers might simply pocket the proceeds of zero rating rather
than invest them in their infrastructure. In a reasonably competitive market
this may not be a problem; carriers with competition will face market
pressure to improve their services with the resources at their disposal.
Where regulators were concerned that zero rating provided large revenues
but the competitive pressures for reinvestment were lacking, they could
179. Cf. Gary S. Becker, Dennis W. Carlton & Hal S. Sider, Net Neutrality and Consumer
Welfare, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 497, 513 (2010) (connecting carriers’ revenue
opportunities to their incentives to invest in infrastructure); Frischmann & van Schewick, supra
note 79, at 423–24 (recognizing that for users to enjoy any of the benefits of the network, Internet
carriers must have sufficient incentives to develop and maintain the network).
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consider setting minimum performance standards to ensure that carriers
kept pace with industry-standard network speeds and prices. Alternatively,
the state could tax sponsored-data revenues and apply the proceeds directly
towards building infrastructure or subsidizing data plans for low-income
citizens.
V. CONCLUSION
Net neutrality, as a debate, has been incredibly generative in
identifying the user choice, innovation, and democratic participation goals
that should guide communications law and policy. The zero-rating debate
poses new challenges. We must now identify the policies that best secure
these capabilities to the billions of people not yet online.
While many scholars and advocates argue zero rating should be
uniformly rejected as a violation of net neutrality, this Article has advanced
an alternative position. Deployed responsibly, zero rating could provide
access to platforms that embody the generative and participatory features of
the open web. It might even cultivate the economic and political demand
necessary to make affordable Internet access a reality for the developing
world. Much work remains to be done, however, to investigate whether
zero rating can actually realize this potential. Diligent regulators must
likewise compare the prospects for zero rating against those of alternative
strategies for closing the digital divide, like direct state subsidies in data and
infrastructure, or investment in new technologies for data transmission.
This Article provides a framework through which scholars, advocates, and
policymakers can begin to identify zero rating’s proper role in
communications law and policy.

